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 1. Introduction 
 
The objective of this study is to describe the Hungarian welfare development in the 20th century in a European 
context with a main focus on analysing the convergent and divergent features. There are several reasons that 
account for this research interest. On the one hand, no systematic comparative study of 20th century Hungarian 
welfare development has been carried out yet, although a comparison may lead to the identification of the unique 
features of 20th century Hungarian welfare development and those that followed general European trends. 
Furthermore, the study of a ”late-comer” country, subsequently ruled by a communist regime may yield lessons 
for international research as well through opening new perspectives in the study of supranational tendencies in 
20th century welfare development.  
Beside the general interest in the long-term comparative study of Hungarian welfare, a more specific 
interest in the problem of European social integration will constitute the basis of the present investigation. 
Current discussions of European integration focus in particular on economy and politics, but much less on the 
social side of the integration process. Another important feature of the ongoing debates is, that issues revolving 
around European integration have been dealt with little reference to historical processes. The interest in social 
integration also leads us to the problem of convergence in welfare development. The analysis of this issue will 
show the extent to which the route Hungary took in the past decades regarding social and, more specifically, 
welfare development conforms to Western European trends and constitutes an integration process in social areas. 
Consequently, in the paper we primarily seek to explore the relationship between Hungarian and Western 
European welfare state development by answering the following questions: Have 20th century changes in 
Hungarian welfare state converged to or diverged from Western European trends? In which periods and in which 
areas of welfare development can convergence and divergence be observed? 
In the introductory chapter we first deal with some important features of comparative research carried 
out on welfare state and social convergence in Europe and in Hungary. Then we describe the research design, the 
major sources of data, as well as the limits of the present investigation, and consider other methodological 
problems posed by comparative research. Chapter 1 describes changes in welfare expenditures in the course of 
the 20th century by applying different definitions. Chapter 2 reveals the development of welfare institutions, 
including variables such as the timing and sequence of the introduction of programs, the process of 
differentiation, and the changes in the structure of individual welfare programs. Chapter 3 examines the 
development in eligibility for welfare benefits, primarily through the changes in those under social insurance and 
social security, the eligibility and the relative level of benefits. Chapter 4 focuses on the organizational forms of 
programs, the role of the state and control mechanisms related to the welfare systems. Finally, Chapter 5 
summarises the results. 
In the individual chapters, using different criteria, we will first present 
the 20th century development of Western European societies highlighting convergent and divergent tendencies 
inside that region separately. Following this, we will show the Hungarian welfare trends by relying on the same 
analysis criteria to the extent possible and dealing with the pre-Second World War and Communist eras 
separately.  
 
  
 
 
 
Comparative Approaches to Welfare 
 
The long traditions of the comparative study of the welfare state make it one of the most advanced fields of 
comparative history and historical sociology.1 Comparative studies have significantly contributed to the analysis 
of the characteristics of the welfare state as well as drawing a picture of the determinants of the formation and 
development of welfare systems. It is the abundance of such research that makes it impossible to give even an 
outline of a literature review in that paper. Instead, related literature will be cited where appropriate in the 
discussion that follow.2 It can be stated here, though, that international historical welfare research is highly 
focused in several respects, while it neglects significant areas and useful approaches. First of all, there is 
chronological and geographic concentration in the research as the main subject of publications is the post-Second 
World War era and the comparison of Western European states or that of Western European and transatlantic 
Anglo-Saxon countries. Research on the first half of the 20th century is rather more scarce and countries outside 
the regions mentioned are rarely discussed even regarding the post-1945 era. There is a striking thematic and 
methodological concentration in historical welfare research, too. Especially the early welfare research primarily 
targeted the comparison of the levels of welfare expenditures in different countries.3  
Although the analysis of welfare expenditures constitutes an important area of research even 
today, ranking welfare states in a linear way, based on the levels of such expenditures has provoked 
criticism early on,4 leading to the investigation of other areas, such as the number of welfare recipients, the 
significance of welfare institutions, the degree of redistribution, etc. Furthermore, many have argued that 
individual characteristics of the welfare state cannot be analysed separately. They propose as the starting 
point the consideration of complex welfare regimes the components of which are interrelated. Among 
                                                 
 
1 Citing only a few important works on comparative history of welfare, Peter Flora and Arnold J. Heidenheimer, 
eds., The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America. New Brunswick and London, 1981.; Peter 
Flora, ed., Growth to Limits. Vol. 1-4. Berlin, 1986-1987.; Jens Alber, Vom Armenhaus zum Wohlfahrtsstaat. 
Analysen zur Entwicklung der Sozialversicherung in Westeuropa. Frankfurt/M.-New York, 1987.; Gerhard A. 
Ritter, Der Sozialstaat. München, 1989.; Hugh Heclo, Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden. >From 
Relief to Income Maintenance. New Haven and London, 1974.; Peter Baldwin, The Politics of Social Solidarity 
and the Bourgeois Basis of the European Welfare State, 1875-1975. Cambridge, 1990. 
2 For a literature review, see e.g. Catherine Jones, Patterns of Social Policy: An Introduction to Comparative 
Analysis. London, 1985.; Joan Higgins, States of Welfare: Comparative Analysis of Social Policy. Oxford, 
1981.; Christopher Pierson, Beyond the Welfare State? The New Political Economy of Welfare. Cambridge, 
1991. 6-140.; Gosta Esping-Andersen, Welfare States and the Economy. In Neil J. Smelser, ed., Handbook of 
Economic Sociology. Priceton, NJ, 1994. 711-732.; For comparisons, see Allan Cochran and John Clarke, 
Comparing Welfare Sates: Britain in International Context. London, 1993. 1-18., 239-269.; James Midgley, 
Social Welfare in Global Context. London, 1997. 89-110.; Alber, Vom Armenhaus zum Wohlfahrtsstaat.; 
Manfred G. Schmidt, Sozialpolitik. Opladen, 1988. 
3For a recent work on the first third of the century see Peter H. Lindert, The Rise of Social Spending, 1880-1930. 
Explorations in Economic History, 31 (1994) 1-37. 
4 Gosta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge, 1990. 19.; Michael Hill, Social 
Policy: A Comparative Analysis. London, 1996. 42. In the Hungarian literature, see Tóth István György and 
Csaba Iván, szerk., A jóléti állam politikai gazdaságtana. Budapest, 1999. 16-18. 
alternative approaches, typologies for the classification of welfare systems based on both quantitative and 
qualitative criteria elicited especially large response. 5 
 
Typologies can be useful in comparative research from several respects. They can promote greater 
analytical depth, contribute to a greater understanding of causal relationships, and provide a tool for 
hypothesis formulation and testing.6 At the same time, criticisms emerging are quite significant, too. 
Especially important of these here is that the data and research these typologies are based on span only one 
or two decades and are almost exclusively form the second half of the 20th century, even though several of 
them claim historical validity. For example, Esping-Andersen’s model reflects only the situation of the 
1970s and 1980s. This is the consequence of the method used, in a sense. Even Esping-Andersen does 
admit typologies are static by definition and insensible to changes and dynamics;7  it is possible that 
welfare had three worlds in certain periods, but two or four in others. If the major variables introduced by 
Esping-Andersen (rules for entitlements, the degree of income replacement and the degree of 
universalisms) were applied in the investigation of welfare systems, almost all Western European countries 
would qualify as conservative or liberal in the first third of the century, because there would show hardly 
any difference between the individual systems. The welfare system termed social democrat emerged much 
later in Scandinavia. Consequently, typologies are not appropriate for historical comparison. Furthermore, 
the aspects included in the existing typologies disregard, by definition, the specialities of communist 
regimes (or, capitalist systems for that matter) and thus they cannot be used in a comparison like the one 
designed here. 
Although the issue of economic convergence clearly received the most attention in research, 
considerable empirical research on the convergence thesis has been carried out by sociologists, historians, 
demographers, and other social scientists as well.8 Sociologists have been particularly active in such areas as 
stratification systems, industrial sociology, and welfare systems, producing conflicting evidences with respect to 
convergence in all these areas.9 In the last decade a renewed interest can be seen in convergence among 
sociologists, when several of them (e.g. G. Therborn, C. Crouch) took up the problem European social 
convergence quite explicitly.10 In the historical research of the past few decades, it was the German social 
                                                 
5 For the residual and institutional division, see Harold L. Wilensky and Charles Lebeaux, Industiral Society and 
Social Welfare. New York, 1965.; For a three-way division, see Richard M. Titmuss, Social Policy. London, 
1974.; An earlier, less explicit formulation, Essays on ’The Welfare State’. London, 1958. 34-55.; Norman 
Furniss and Timothy Tilton, The Case for the Welfare State. From Social Security to Social Equality. 
Bloomington and London, 1979. 15-20.; Gosta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. 21-
22. Cambridge, 1990.; Gosta Esping-Andersen, Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies. Oxford, 1999.; 
For a four way division, including a radical type in addition to those discussed later, see Francis G. Castles and 
Deborah Mitchell, Worlds of Welfare and Families of Nations. In Francis G. Castles, ed., Families of Nations. 
Patterns of Public Policy in Western Democracies. Aldershot, 1993. 93-128. 
6 Gosta Esping-Andersen, Social Foundations of Postindustrial Societities. Oxford, 1999. 73. 
7 Esping-Andersen, Social Foundations. 87. 
8 Citing only a few classic publications on convergence, see Clark Kerr et al., Industrialism and Industrial Man. 
Cambridge, Mass., 1960.; Pitirim A. Sorokin, Mutual Convergence of the United States and the U.S.S.R. to the 
Mixed Sociocultural Type. International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 1 (1960) 143-176.; J. Tinbergen, Do 
Communist and Free Economies Show a Converging Pattern? Soviet Studies, 12 (1961) 333-341.; We only refer 
to a widely cited theoretical work on economic convergence here, Robert J. Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 
Economic Growth. New York, 1995. 26-39, 382-413. 
9 John B. Williamson and Jeanne J. Flemming, ”Convergence Theory and the Social Welfare Sector: A Cross-
National Analysis”. International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 18 (1977) 3-4, 242-253.;  Robert Erikson 
and John H. Goldthorpe and Lucienne Portocarero, ”Intergenerational Class Mobility and the Convergence 
Thesis: England, France, and Sweden”. British Journal of Sociology, 34 (1983) 303-343.; Pekka Kosonen, 
”European Welfare State Models”. International Journal of Sociology, 4 (1995) 81-110. 
10 Göran Therborn, Europan Modernity and Beyond. The Trajectory of European Societies, 1945-2000. London, 
1995. 352-353.; Colin Crouch, Social Change in Western Europe. Oxford, 1999. 404-409.; Simon Langlois et 
historian, Hartmut Kaelble, who carried out the most systematic research on social convergence according to 
which the developments of Western European societies have converged in significant areas of social life during 
the 20th century.11 
 
As indicated above, no systematic comparative study has been carried out of 20th century Hungarian 
welfare development. With a few exceptions, only the comparison of post-1960 welfare attracted attention and, 
within this, mostly the changes in expenditures.12 Regarding he solution of methodological problems involved in 
comparisons in this area, significant attempts have been made only with respect to the 1980s.13 In addition, 
several comparative works treated Hungary only marginally, as a part of the Eastern Block, and mostly 
concerning in the period after 1960.14 The latest and perhaps most notable attempt to include Eastern European 
welfare systems, mostly disregarded elsewhere, in analysis with Western European ones, was published by 
Göran Therborn. He uses three variables in his analysis, the relative size of welfare spending, the role of the state 
and universalism. Still, these aspects are used for a systematic comparison only regarding the 1970s and 1980s. 
Therborn’s variables are definitely worthy of consideration, although should be supplemented and the place he 
assigned to Hungary is based on improper observation in some respects.15 
                                                                                                                                                        
al., Convergence or Divergence? Comparing Recent Social Trends in Industrial Societies. Frankfurt/M. and 
London, 1994. 
11 Hartmut Kaelble, Auf dem Weg zu einer europäischen Gesellschaft. München, 1987.; Hartmut Kaelble,  A 
Social History of Western Europe, 1880-1980. Dublin, 1990.; An excerpt from Kaelble’s book, Hartmut Kaelble, 
Útban egy európai társadalom felé. Nyugat-Európa társadalomtörténete, 1880-1980. In Andorka Rudolf and 
Stefan Hradil and Jules L. Peschar, szerk., Társadalmi rétegződés. Budapest, é.n. 161-170.; Most recently, 
Hartmut Kaelble, Europäische Vielfalt und der Weg zu einer europäischen Gesellschaft. In Stefan Hradil and 
Stefan Immerfall (Hrsg.), Die westeuropäischen Gesellschaften im Vergleich. Opladen, 1997. 27-68.; H. Kaelble 
also deals with employment structures, social mobility, social inequality, the quality of urban life, family, labour 
relations, and in his recent studies he also includes the patterns of mass consumption. Kaelble, Europäische 
Vielfalt. 40-42. 
12 Regarding exceptions, see e.g. Susan Zimmermann and Gerhard Melinz, A szegényügy "szerves" fejlődése 
vagy radikális reform? Kommunális közjótékonyság Budapesten és Bécsben (1873-1914). Aetas, (1994):3, 37-
70.; Susan Zimmermann, Prächtige Armut. Fürsorge, Kinderschutz und Sozialreform in Budapest. Das 
"sozialpolitische Laboratorium" der Donaumonarchie im Vergleich zu Wien, 1873-1914. Sigmaringen, 1997.; 
Susan Zimmermann, Geschützte und ungeschützte Arbeitsverhältnisse von der Hochindustrialisierung bis zur 
Weltwirtschaftskrise. Österreich und Ungarn im Vergleich. In Andrea Komlossy and Christof Parnreiter and 
Irene Stacher and Susan Zimmermann (Hrsg.), Ungeregelt und untebezahlt. Der informelle Sektor in der 
Weltwirtschaft. Frankfurt/M.  and  Wien, 1997. 87-115.; Szikra Dorottya, Modernizáció és társadalombiztosítás 
a 20. század elején.  In Augusztinovics Mária (szerk.), Körkép reform után. Budapest, 2000. 11-27.; Az egyik 
legutóbbi munka a nemzetközi irodalomban, Lynne Haney, Familial Welfare: Building the Hungarian Welfare 
Society, 1948-1968. Social Politics, 7 (2000):1, 101-122.; Contemporary comparison for the pre-1945 period, 
Kovrig Béla, A munka védelme a dunai államokban. Kolozsvár, 1944. 
13 Gács Endre, Szociális kiadásaink nemzetközi összehasonlításban. Statisztikai Szemle, 63 (1985):12, 1226-
1236.; Tóth and Csaba, szerk., A jóléti állam politikai gazdaságtana.; For Hungary and Finland, see Rudolf 
Andorka, The Use of Time Series in International Comparison. In Else Oyen, ed., Comparative Methodology. 
London, 1990. 103-223.; Ferge Zsuzsa, A szociálpolitika hazai fejlődése. In Ferge Zsuzsa and Várnai Györgyi, 
Szociálpolitika ma és holnap. Budapest, 1987. 41-48.; Zsuzsa Ferge, Social Policy Regimes and Social Structure. 
In Zsuzsa Ferge and J. E. Kolberg eds., Social Policy in a Changing Europe. Frankfurt/M. and Boulder, Co., 
1992. 201-222. 
14See, e.g., Francis G. Castles, Whatever Happened to the Communist Welfare State? Studies in Comparative 
Communism, Vol. XIX (1986):3-4, 213-226.; Also see Bob Deacon, Social policy and socialism. London, 1983. 
81-89., 154-161., 199-207. 
15 Therborn, European Modernity and Beyond. 96. 
If studies not applying comparative approach are taken into account, the literature on the Hungarian 
welfare system naturally proves to be more extensive. Still, as regards the first half of the century, only a few 
historical studies are available16 and the historical perspective has obviously been secondary in economic and  
 
sociological research on welfare. Because of the late establishment of this field in Hungary, sociology 
concentrates on the period from the 1960s on with special significance of Zsuzsa Ferge´s studies.17 
 
Research Design 
In the following we shall compare the Hungarian and Western European development of welfare systems in the 
20th century relying on findings from previous research on the welfare state but attempting to avoid its biases. As 
previous research does not offer appropriate frameworks for a study covering a long period, the first task was the 
selection and development of the variables and methods of the study. In this, our  objectives were: a) to reflect, 
as much as possible, the main aspects identified in research on (Western) European welfare states, also 
considering the diversity of these states beyond welfare expenditures or any other single dimension; b) to make 
historical research possible, as well as the assessment of the dynamics of changes in some form. For the latter, 
quantitative analysis is an important, though not exclusive, method. Our aim was to compile data series on 
welfare development so that long term analysis become possible; and, finally, c) not to be biased for any welfare 
system, i.e. to develop a framework for the examination of all welfare systems, appropriate for identifying the 
characteristics of 20th century Western European as well as Hungarian welfare systems, including the post-1945, 
communist era. 
Considering the above, the major variables of the comparison are: 1) welfare expenditures (the 
relative size of welfare expenditures based on different methods of calculations, and expressed as 
percentage of the economic output); 2) relative importance of welfare institutions (the timing of the 
introduction of programs; the sequence of introduction; the process of expansion and differentiation 
regarding the programs; the changes in the structure of expenditures); 3) the characteristics of welfare 
rights (what percentage of the population receives benefits based on what principles; the level of benefits); 
4) organisational forms of welfare programs, the degree and characteristics of state involvement; the 
control exercised by those eligible for benefits over welfare institutions and vice versa, the control of 
welfare institutions over those receiving benefits. 
Obviously, there are other possible aspects for analysis, e.g. the degree of redistribution through welfare 
institutions, the role of state and public organisations in different areas of welfare, issues of legal regulation, the 
decentralisation vs. centralisation of administration, the role of gender in welfare, etc.18 Nevertheless, the aspects 
selected cover most of the important elements discussed in the literature, including Esping-Andersen’s major 
                                                 
16 Gyáni Gábor, Könyörületesség, fegyelmezés, avagy a szociális gondoskodás genealógiája. Történelmi Szemle, 
XLI (1999) 1-2, 57-84.; Gyáni Gábor, A szociálpolitika múltja Magyarországon. Budapest, 1994.; Gyáni Gábor, 
A szociálpolitika első lépései hazánkban: Darányi törvényei. In Darányi Ignác emlékkonferencia. Budapest, 
2000. 94-110.; Csöppüs István, Komáromi norma – egy szociálpolitikai kísérlet. Századok, 126 (1992) 2, 259-
283.; Ferge Zsuzsa, Fejezetek a magyarországi szegénypolitika történetéből. Budapest, 1986.; For two recent 
syntheses, see Kövér György and Gyáni Gábor, Magyarország társadalomtörténete a reformkortól a második 
világháborúig. Budapest, 1988.; Valuch Tibor, Magyarország társadalomtörténete a XX. század második 
felében. Budapest, 2001. 344-350. 
17 Probably the most significant work regarding the social policy in the second half of the century Zsuzsa Ferge, 
A Society in the Making: Hungarian Social and Societal Policy, 1945-1975. New York, 1979. 
18 For possible aspects, see Ritter, Der Sozialstaat. 102. 
variables, Jens Alber’s aspects of analysis for social insurance, Göran Therborn’s variables mentioned above or 
Romke J. van der Veen’s economic–social rights–administrative/organisational dimensions, too.19 
Our most important thematic limitation is comparing the development of welfare states primarily, 
though not exclusively, through the development of social security, and first of all its major component, 
the social insurance systems.20 This choice is supported by the significance of social security programs. 
Although  
 
social security has been associated with other welfare institutions (e.g. aid programs or housing policy) 
right from the beginnings, it was a basic institutional breakthrough in the process of the formation of the 
welfare state.21 
This limitation can undoubtedly reduce the validity of findings significantly, since other welfare 
programs also target the elimination or prevention of inequalities brought about by the market economy, 
though through means different from social security. Despite the constraints, we find that the importance 
of the areas examined means that they are good indicators of the main tendencies in the development of the 
welfare state. Thus the approach might be appropriate for the intended comparisons but would at least 
serve as a starting point for further, more comprehensive comparisons. 
 
Methodology, sources, data analysis, and statistical problems 
The questions we would like to answer about social convergences in 20th century Europe, obviously need the 
analysis of a large number of societies over a long period of time. Therefore, we have applied quite extensively – 
but not exclusively – a quantitative approach. Such research, by its very nature, demands greater compromises in 
methods than a research more limited in its scope. Thus the present comparison is constrained beyond the 
thematic limitations conditions indicated above.  
An important methodological problem is – present in many comparative studies –, that of what is 
compared to what, i.e. what is regarded to be the unit of comparison. Hungary as the unit of comparison is given 
in this case. It is not evident, however, which countries are regarded as Western European ones. When selecting 
the Western European countries into the sample, an effort was made to include ones that produced similar socio-
economic and political development in the 20th century. Thus among the countries analysed, beside Norway and 
Switzerland, the present EU member states are included with the exception of Spain, Greece, Portugal, and 
Luxembourg. The inclusion of the latter one was hindered by very practical reasons, namely the unavailability of 
sources. Nevertheless, no attempt has been made to claim that other countries could not have been considered for 
inclusion in the sample. 
                                                 
19 Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. 70-71.; Alber, Vom Armenhaus zum 
Wohlfahrtsstaat. 42.; Therborn, European Modernity and Beyond. 96.; Romke J. van der Veen, Social Solidarity: 
The Development of the Welfare State in the Netherlands and the United States. In Hans Bak-Frits van Holthoon  
and  Hans Krabbendan eds., Social and Secure? Politics and Culture of the Welfare State. Amsterdam, 1996. 60-
61. 
20 We use the term social security to refer to social insurance and its assimilated schemes (family allowance, 
maternity benefits). Although we try to employ the terms in their exact meanings, because of the relatively minor 
significance of the latter programmes in most countries and periods, social security is virtually interchangeable 
with the term social insurance. 
21 Abram de Swaan, Der sorgende Staat. Wohlfahrt, Gesundheit und Bildung in Europa und den USA der 
Neuzeit. Frankfurt/M., 1993. 170-186.; Gerold Ambrosius and William Hubbard, A Social and Economic 
History of Europe. 116.; Alber, Vom Armenhaus zum Wohlfarhtsstaat. 27.; Flora and Heidenheimer, The 
Historical Core and Changing Boundaries of the Welfare State. 27.; Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Hugh Heclo 
and Carolyn Teich Adams, Comparative Public Policy. The Politics of Social Choice in America, Europe, and 
Japan. New York, 1990. 229. 
Comparative studies published in the past decades have amply documented that the social and welfare 
development of Western Europe was not unified, therefore it is not without problems if one treats this region as a 
unit of comparison.22 This methodological difficulty may be balanced out in the interpretation by a differentiated 
treatment of developmental processes within Western Europe. Also, obvious differences between individual 
societies can not fade the fact that 20th century modern industrial states, and especially their Western European 
forms, do show certain similarities in their treatment of welfare problems. H. Kaelble considers it as an indicator 
of similarities that one of the three types in the most influential typology, also cited in the present work, was able 
to comprise the whole of continental Western Europe.23  Besides the correct presentation of differences within 
the region, these similarities may form the basis for comparing Hungary to Western Europe in the above sense. 
In addition, the statistical methods applied do not simply assess convergent and divergent processes within 
Western Europe. They enable us to compare Hungary and Western Europe even when the differences in the 
latter are significant and even when, as will be shown, divergence can be detected between the development of 
individual Western European societies. It is quite obvious, however, that the comparison we are embarking on 
will be an asymmetrical one with all its methodological consequences; first of all, the development of the 
societies that make up Western Europe can not be analysed with such a depth as the Hungarian trends.24  
The present study covers the period between 1918 and 1990 sometimes called the ”short 20th” century 
by historians. The end of World War I and the fall of European communist regimes were significant historical 
turning points for Europe and the world and there are plausible arguments to support that intra-European wars 
and tensions give an inner unity for this period. However, these major political changes do not necessarily 
demarcate major social changes as well. Especially the beginning point seems to be somewhat arbitrary in this 
sense, so we go back further to pre-World War I times if it is necessary.  
There are several international data sets containing welfare data.25 However, none of them covers the 
whole period under investigation, and all of the areas and 14 countries we intend to incorporate into the study. 
Using different types of sources, we compiled own our data set which contains several indicators on welfare 
change. This set of indicators also has its limitations. For some periods (interwar years), and some areas (welfare 
expenditures) we were unable to obtain appropriate data and the quality of some of the existing data might be 
unequal. However, we believe these limitations do not seriously restrict the intended comparison. 
Based on that data set, the development of Hungarian welfare will be examined in comparison to 
Western Europe through statistical procedures as well.26 Common methods for measuring convergence are the 
                                                 
22 Peter Flora and Arnold J. Heidenheimer, The Historical Core and Changing Boundaries of the Welfare State. 
17-34.; Peter A. Köhler and H. F. Zacher, Hrsg., Ein Jahrhundert Sozialversicherung in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, Frankreich, Grossbritannien, Österreich und der Schweiz. Berlin, 1981.; Hugh Heclo, Modern 
Social Politics in Britain and Sweden. New Haven and London, 1974.; Alber, Vom Armenhaus zum 
Wohlfahrtsstaat.; Peter Flora, ed., Growth to Limits. The Western European Welfare States Since World War II. 
Vol. 1-4. Berlin, 1986-1988. 
23 Hartmut Kaelble, Wie kam es zum Europäischen Sozialmodell? Jahrbuch für Europa- und Nordamerika-
Studien, 4 (2000) 45.   
24 On asymmetrical comparisons, see Jürgen Kocka, Asymmetrical Historical Comparison: The Case of the 
German Sonderweg. History and Theory, 38 (1999) 40-50.    
25 ILO, The Cost of Social Security. Geneva, 1949ff. (Different volumes.); OECD, Social Expenditure, 1960-
1990. Paris, 1985.; Peter Flora, ed., State, Economy, and Society in Western Europe, 1815-1975. Vol. I. 
Frankfurt/M., 1983.; Flora, ed., Growth to Limits. Vol. 1-4. 
26 On forms of convergence, see Alex Inkeles, ”Convergence and Divergence in Industrial Societies”. In Mustafa 
O. Attir, et al., ed., Directions of Change. Boulder, Co., 1981. 13. 
standard deviation or variance and the coefficient of variation. We also calculate the convergence of Western 
European countries by using the coefficient of variation because it is adjusted for shifts in the mean (i.e. a 10 
point spread is likely to have a different interpretation around a mean of 50, than, say, around a mean of 20). The 
greater the decrease in the coefficient of variation over a specified period of time, the greater the convergence, 
and the greater the increase in the coefficient of variation, the greater the divergence.  
However, in contrast to several other studies, which measure convergence among countries, in the 
present analysis convergence is assessed between one specific country, Hungary, and a group of countries, 
Western Europe.  For this purpose the coefficient of variation seems to be not suitable. In order to overcome this 
difficulty, we measure convergence of Hungary and Western European societies using the standardised 
Hungarian data. That indicator takes into account both the changes in the Hungarian data and the Western 
European standard deviations and means, and therefore provides more comprehensive information. 
Standardisation is the transformation of values of a distribution, so that it has mean 0 and standard deviation 1. 
We can reach the standardised Hungarian data through subtracting the respective Western European means from 
the Hungarian data and then dividing it by the Western European standard deviations. The difference of this 
number from zero shows the degree of diversion from the Western European data. The greater the decrease in 
the standardised data over a specified period of time, the greater the convergence and vice versa.27 These indices 
are not only suitable for properly indicating convergent or divergent tendencies, but they also make it possible to 
measure the convergence of Hungarian development even when Western European societies diverge in an area 
of welfare development.28 (Appendix) 
 
 
2. Expenditures 
 
In the following, the changes in welfare expenditures will be examined in four different areas. First, the major 
social insurance programs (accident, pension, sickness and unemployment) and public expenditure on health will 
be explored. The ILO data collection of social security expenditures provides information about the period 
following the Second World War based on a broader definition including family, maternity, invalidity and 
survivors benefits besides the four main social security programs and public health expenditures. Finally, the 
OECD data collection on social expenditures has an even wider scope, embracing education and housing-related 
public expenditures as well as investments in the welfare sector in addition to the programs surveyed by the ILO.  
The research literature usually regards Germany as a vanguard on the turn of the century with regard to 
social insurance expenditures and social expenditures in general. In 1900 about 1% of the gross domestic product 
was spent on these services, while 2.6% of the GDP was spent on social insurance and poor relief before World 
War I.29 However, a relatively large body of comparable data regarding West European social insurance 
                                                 
27 As a result, the standardised data take into account both major forms of convergence described in the 
literature: the absolute convergence (beta convergence), which occurs when the observed values come closer to 
each other; and the convergence in deviation (sigma convergence), which occurs when the dispersion of the 
observed values decreases over time. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, Economic Growth. 26-39., 382-413.; Xavier Sala-
i-Martin, The Classical Approach to Convergence Analysis. Economic Journal, 106 (1996) 1019-1036. 
28 On types of convergences, see Inkeles, Convergence and Divergence. 14-27. 
29 Peter Flora, Solution or source of crises? In W. J. Mommsen, ed., The Emergence of the Welfare State in 
Britain and Germany, 1850-1950. London, 1981. 359. 
expenditures is available only from as late as 1930.30 At this point it was still Germany where the most resources, 
5.2% of the GDP was allocated for these purposes.31 Great Britain was second on the list with 4.6%  with Austria 
closely following with 4.4%. Ireland and Denmark came in the middle of the list (2.8 and 2.6%), while other 
Scandinavian countries spent a markedly lower percentage of their domestic product, 0.7% (Finland) and 1.1% 
(Sweden), on social insurance. 
From 1950 onwards complete data sets are available regarding the four main social security programs in 
the examined West European countries, which are of better quality and consistency than the former ones. Figures 
from the middle of the century exceeded those two decades earlier everywhere, though, statistics from this 
period onwards will include public expenditures on health as well.32 The only exception was Germany badly hit 
by the war and unable to reach the relatively high level of expenditures of the first half of the century. Growth in 
the fifties was also steady, although its rate was lower than in the preceding two decades. It was the 1960s and 
the first half of the 1970s that saw the most dramatic increase. In the latter period, for example, in a number of 
the countries (Italy, Ireland, Switzerland and West Germany) the ratio of social insurance and public health 
expenditures to the GDP rose by 50% only over a few years. Although up to the middle of the 1970s growth was 
universal, the dynamics of expenditures and their levels were uneven across countries. In 1975 Sweden, having 
the highest rate of growth alongside with the Netherlands and Italy in the previous decades, spent twice as much 
on social security and public health than the United Kingdom. The most striking change took place in the relative 
position of the United Kingdom: in 1950 it was at the top of the list closely behind Germany, but, its 
expenditures stagnating, by the mid-1970s it was the country in Western Europe that spent the least on social 
security compared to its GDP. 
The middle of the 1970s can be regarded as a watershed in a sense that from this time on there is an 
almost general decline in the growth rate of expenditures in most countries. Moreover, in the second half of the 
1980s the ratio of social insurance expenditures already stagnated or even decreased in a number of the 
countries. The most dramatic fall took place in Ireland, Finland (which saw the fastest growth at the beginning of 
the 80s) and in the United Kingdom. The Western European average at the end of the 80s is lagging behind the 
average of five years earlier and only slightly exceeds the level of 10 years before. (Appendix) This occurred in 
tandem with a further differentiation between the countries of Western Europe. At the end of the period 
examined, the Netherlands, having the second highest ratio (20.9%) was lagging well behind the 28.6% of 
Sweden, while the countries spending the least on social insurance relative to their GDP were the United 
Kingdom (9.9%) and Switzerland (11.4%). 
                                                 
30 For social insurance and social security expenditures in Western Europe see, Flora, ed., State, Economy and 
Society in Western Europe. Vol. I. 456.; ILO, The cost of social security. Fourteenth international inquiry, 1987-
1989. Geneva, 1996. 108-165. and other volumes of the series.; Flora, Solution or source of crises? 359.; 
Statistisches Bundesamt, Bevölkerung und Wirtschaft, 1872-1972. Stuttgart, 1972. 219-260.; Wolfram Fischer 
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32 Between 1950 and 1977 public health expenditures includes free hospitalization, medical care, and sanitation. 
From 1978 onwards a narrower definition applies. In countries with state health care system (United Kingdom, 
Italy, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Sweden) the costs of the systems are included in the public health 
expenditures until 1977 and in social insurance expenditures from 1978 onwards. ILO, The cost of social 
security. Eleventh international inquiry, 1978-1980. Geneva, 1985. 2-3., 78. 
Beyond the methodological problems already mentioned, the comparability of the social security figures 
is limited somewhat for the reason that the special schemes for public employees are not included, which affects 
countries to different degrees, depending on whether they had a program of this kind and, if such programs 
existed, how developed these were. Consequently, the data of the countries where these programs had a major 
role (e.g. Germany, Austria) appear to be lower than they actually were, due to the fact that a proportion of their 
citizens received benefits through these programs and not through the normal social insurance schemes. 
The ILO data collection on social security expenditures provides better figures for comparison than 
social insurance expenditures in the narrow sense.33 The wider definition of ILO includes not only the four main 
social insurance services and public health service, but also family, maternity and social insurance expenditures 
to public servants and also expenditures on certain types of assistance (for example, non-contributory pensions) 
and benefits to war victims. By adopting this definition, most of the comparative methodological pitfalls can 
undoubtedly be eliminated, although some inconsistencies in statistics still remain, because the ILO survey 
underestimate expenditures by some percentage points for certain countries against other data sets using a similar  
 
 
approach.34 However, for the decades succeeding the Second World War, social security expenditures by the 
ILO definition show a pattern of growth similar to social insurance expenditures in the narrow sense, with slower 
rise at the beginning and end of the period and rapid increase in the 60s and 70s. The path taken by individual 
countries was also similar to what could be seen in the case of social insurance. West Germany had the highest 
rate of expenditures in 1950, and France, Belgium and Austria alike spent large amounts on these purposes. At 
this time Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands and Switzerland were among the countries spending the least. 
The highest rate of growth is characteristic of exactly this latter group of countries, with the exception of 
Switzerland, where the rate of growth was steadily low from the middle of the 50s until the end of the examined 
period. Countries that had been traditionally big spenders (West Germany, Belgium, Austria) were surpassed by 
the Netherlands at the end of the 60s and a decade later it was Sweden heading the list. Regarding the period 
between 1950 and 1990, Sweden had the highest rate of growth, with the Netherlands and Denmark close 
behind. France also witnessed a high rate of growth in this period, while the United Kingdom had the lowest 
percentage of rise in social security spending and the West Germany rate of growth was also moderate. By the 
end of the 80s Sweden’s expenditure rate of 35.9% was the highest, leaving the almost identical rates of the 
Netherlands (28.5%) and Denmark (28.4%) well behind. 
Social security plays a special role among social welfare programs for the above mentioned reasons, 
and its development is also in the focus of the present study. It has to be noted, though that this category, even 
with public health expenditures and family and maternity benefits included, covers only a part of  all the welfare 
expenditures. Social assistance in the broader sense, education and housing expenditures as well as investments 
                                                 
33 Cf. ILO, The cost of social security. Eleventh international inquiry, 1978-1980. Geneva, 1985. 57-58.; ILO, 
The cost of social security. Fourteenth international inquiry, 1987-1989. Geneva, 1996. 74-75.; ILO, World 
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in the welfare sector not included in the statistics above can all be included among social expenditures. 
Therefore, it seems expedient to give a brief account of the OECD data collection based on such broad definition 
for the last decades.35 These data are not complete either for the first half of the 20th century, but for the second 
half they can be practically regarded as complete. 
Employing this broad definition, the ratio of expenditures to the GDP will significantly increase, in 
some cases it will double or even triple compared to social insurance expenditures. This was the case already in 
the beginning of the century. In 1913 Germany spent 6.1% of its GDP on welfare purposes in the wider sense, 
such as social insurance, education, public health, which was the highest ratio in Western Europe. In the early 
20th century Switzerland, the United Kingdom and Ireland also had a high expenditure ratio.36 In the interwar 
period the ratio of social expenditures showed a steady growth and exceeded 5% in all the countries with the 
exception of Finland and Italy. Growth after the Second World War shows little divergence from that of social 
insurance and social security, reaching their peaks at about the same time, and the countries with the highest and  
 
lowest expenditure ratio roughly coincide, too. In the years following the Second World War welfare legislation 
intensified, which affected welfare expenditures as well. Great Britain is a very obvious example here and so is 
Finland, a country with modest welfare state between the two world wars, where the annual growth of social 
expenditures amounted to 22.2% between 1945 and 1950. In Ireland social policy gained momentum as well.37 
The 1950s, on the other hand, can be considered a period of relative stagnation, because the relative level of 
resources spent on welfare increased only slightly. From approximately 1960 a new era began, spanning to the 
middle of the 1970s, which is characterised by the highest rate of growth in Western European social 
expenditures for the whole period examined. Denmark and Norway had the most dynamic rise in this period with 
more than 8% per annum in real value, while the United Kingdom and Austria had the lowest rate (less than 
4%).38 The average rate of growth approximately halved  between the mid 1970s and the mid 80s. The relative 
ratio of social expenditures to the GDP reached their peak at the beginning or middle of the 1980s in most of the 
countries. In 1980 the Netherlands and Sweden headed the list with around 40%, while Switzerland and the 
United Kingdom spent the least on these purposes; the Western European average was at about 30%. 
Expenditures in the 1980s increase further but the steady growth characterising the previous decades in all the 
countries was superseded by a more complex pattern. While the rate of expenditure growth remained high in 
Finland and Norway in this decade as well, in other countries it stagnated or even decreased slightly (e.g. in the 
United Kingdom, Ireland, the Netherlands and Belgium). 
 
Various indicators examined show that in terms of the relative level of welfare expenditures there were 
significant differences between West European countries in the first half of the 20th century, but these 
                                                 
35 At the same time the OECD-data exclude special benefits for public employees, such as pensions probably 
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36 Christopher Pierson, Beyond the Welfare State? Cambridge, 1991. 111. 
37 Pierson, Beyond the Welfare State? 136. 
38 OECD, The Future of Social Protection. Paris, 1988. 11. 
significantly decreased by the 1950s, and the tendency of convergence continued steadily in the next two 
decades. Subsequently, the coefficient of variation from the middle of the 1970s onwards displayed different 
patterns for the various types of expenditures. With social insurance expenditures narrowly defined, the trend 
reversed and variation increased until the end of the examined period.39 Though this indicated a significant 
divergence, differences between Western European countries were  slightly smaller in 1990 than in 1950, and 
were far smaller than the differences between the two world wars. On the other hand, social security 
expenditures by the ILO definition, which detected smaller differences between individual countries from the 
start, show only a slight increase of the coefficient of variation at the end of the period examined. In the case of 
social expenditures based on the broad OECD definition, in contrast with the two indices discussed before, the 
trend of levelling out continued, and in 1990 the coefficient of variation indicating the differences between 
individual countries was only one-fourth of the coefficient found four decades earlier (Appendix). 
 
*** 
 
Only a small body of data is available regarding Hungary’s welfare expenditures in the first half of the 
century. However, available sources clearly suggest that in 1930 the 1.6%  ratio of social insurance expenditures 
relative to economic output is lagging well behind the 2.5% average of the examined Western European  
 
 
 
countries accompanied by high variance (we have no data on Italy, France and Belgium from this period), but 
surpasses the countries at the end of the list such as Finland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.40  
Although not affecting the 1930 figures, the 1927 pension insurance reform, to be discussed below, can 
be regarded as an important move, a sort of breakthrough in the social security of Hungarian population 
employed outside the agriculture and the public sector. In his contemporary analysis Béla Kovrig already argued 
convincingly that this reform set pensions at a level that compares favourably with the international standard, 
though it applied only to new pensioners and contributors. His statements were supported by the contemporary 
ILO surveys as well.41 Therefore, with the gradual maturation of eligibilities the significant increase of welfare 
expenditures was to be expected, although due to the waiting periods the reform’s impact on social security 
expenditures can hardly be detected sooner than from the end of the 30s. Expenditures stagnated during the years 
of depression only to pick up again after it was over: their ratio to economic output amounted to 2.3%  in 1935 
and 2.7% in 1940. We have comparable data from Germany for this decade, where social insurance expenditures 
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Series M, No. 11. Geneva, 1933. 361-390.; Magyar Statisztikai Évkönyv. 1940. Budapest, 1941. 59.; Statisztikai 
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M. 361-390. 
relative to gross domestic product decreased for roughly the same period (1930-1938). Consequently, the gap 
between the Hungarian and German expenditure levels narrowed in the 30s.42  
A much larger body of data is accessible on Hungarian welfare contributions from the period following 
the Second World War. Nevertheless, difficulties do arise when comparing these data with those from Western 
Europe. One type of difficulty is presented by the fact that in Western Europe welfare expenditures are 
calculated in proportion to either the GDP or the GNP, while in Hungary it had been the practice for decades to 
publish  data only relative to the Net Material Product. As a result of the communist approach to economics, this 
latter figure only covered material production and so called material services, therefore welfare expenditures 
expressed in its percentages are not suitable for direct comparison with Western European figures. Surprisingly, 
historical calculations so far, including ILO publications and other major works used these figures with no 
corrections for comparative purposes. 43 Still, there exist retrospective GDP calculations for Hungary with some 
shortcomings as well, but they are great help in calculating Hungarian indices which are directly comparable 
with Western European figures. In several cases our own estimations were calculated to supply missing data.44 
 
 
In 1950 social insurance and public health expenditures in Hungary equalled 3.2% of the estimated 
GDP.45 This percentage can not be directly compared with pre-war Hungarian data because of the inclusion of 
public health expenditures (prevention of epidemics, etc.), and that of the pension and other welfare benefits of 
state and public employees. It is not possible to separate the latter from the benefits of other social groups, 
therefore corrections have been made to pre-war figures for comparative purposes. 
If the pensions of state employees (public servants, teachers, railway officers, state factory employees) 
and those of their relatives and survivors, financed by sources other than social security, are taken into account, 
rather higher social expenditure  percentages emerge for the pre-war period.46 In 1930 224.7 million Pengős were 
allocated for these purposes from the state budget.47 Adding this amount that significantly exceeded 
contemporary social insurance expenditures, the total expenditures amount to 326.7 million Pengős and account 
for 5.2% of the NNP.48 This percentage further increased in the years of the recession due to the shrinking 
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45 The same expenditures made up 3.8% of the NMP in 1950. 
46 For social benefits of public employees offered outside the social security programs, see Ladik Gusztáv, Jóléti 
intézményeink. Budapest, 1940. 342-349. 
47 A magyar állam zárszámadása az 1930-31. évről. Budapest, 1932. 60-153.; 306-310. 
48 The data refer to contributions paid by insured persons and employers and state contributions. Bikkal Dénes, 
Társadalombiztosítás Magyarországon. Közgazdasági Szemle, LVIII (1934), 6-8. szám. 389. ; For the pensions 
of public employees, see Hollós István, A közszolgálati alkalmazottak nyugdíjkérdése és a megoldási 
lehetőségek. Budapest, 1940. 3-55.  Bikkal, Társadalombiztosítás Magyarországon. 389.; Eckstein, National 
national product. In 1932, for example, the total sum allocated for pensions, including the benefits of state 
employees, health insurance and occupational injuries insurance expenditures amounted to 380.27 million 
Pengős.  This means that 7.7% of the 4.9 billion Pengős NNP was allocated for these purposes.49 Therefore, if  
the  calculations of the 1930s are made according to the definitions of the post-1950 period, figures will indicate 
that the percentage of social insurance expenditures in the 30s in Hungary was considerably higher than in the 
fist decades of the communist era. This ratio of expenditures allocated for pensions, healthcare, other welfare 
services and public health services to the GDP was not reached again in Hungary until the beginning of the 
1970s. 50 
The growth of social security expenditures in the 1950s turns out to be especially low in the light 
of the significant increase in the number of those eligible, which was due to the maturing of the eligibilities 
of the 1928 pension reform on the one hand and the extension of coverage after the Second World War on 
the other. The level of benefits and the regulation of eligibility will be discussed in more detail below. 
The level of social security expenditures in the 1950s and 60s was also relatively low in comparison 
with Western European figures, equalling approximately two-third of the Western European average. In the 
1970s the gap between Hungary and Western Europe seems to have become narrower, although it has to be 
noted that this can be partly attributed to the fact that from 1978 onwards Western European figures do not 
include public health expenditures, while Hungarian ones still do. Taking this difference also into account 
diminishes Hungary’s rate of  convergence. The 1980s saw a slight fall in the rate of growth in Hungary, but  
 
there was a sharp increase at the end of the decade.  For example, between 1989 and 1990, in just one year, the 
ratio of expenditures to the GDP rose from 14.5% to 15.8%. This is, however, already closely related to the so 
called transformation crisis, which resulted in a fall in economic output, on the one hand, and, with the actual 
emergence of unemployment an increase in the demand for social allowances, on the other. This growth, in 
parallel with the slump in the growth rate of social expenditures in Western Europe (and even the stagnation of, 
or fall in, expenditures in some cases), resulted in the first significant convergence under the communist regime 
between Hungary and Western Europe in this area in the 80s. However, social insurance expenditures in 
Hungary could not reach the West European average even at the end of the 1980s (Appendix). 
As pointed out above in another context, there are two major differences in the methodology of 
post-Second World War social insurance calculations in Hungary and Western Europe. On the one hand, 
the special social insurance benefits of public employees by the state and on the other hand, war victims 
benefits are not included in West European figures, which limit the validity of the comparison. These 
difficulties can be mostly overcome by the ILO social security calculations based on a broader definition 
of expenditures (social insurance, maternity and family benefits, disabled/war widow assistance, public 
health expenditures).51 These expenditures rose dynamically in Hungary as well after the Second World 
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49 Excluding public health expenditures. Bikkal, Társadalombiztosítás Magyarországon. 389.; Eckstein, National 
Income and Capital Formation in Hungary, 1900-1950. 165.; Béry László and Kun Andor, Magyarország 
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War, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, and their ratio to the GDP was five-times as high in 1990 than in 
1950. The manifold increase, however, was to a large extent due to the low basis – 3.8% in 1950. Despite 
its steady growth, the ratio of social security expenditures became as high as 20% only by the end of the 
period examined, amounting to four-fifths of the West European average. As mentioned before, however, 
this was partly due to the recession of the Hungarian economy, as the GDP, and especially its officially 
registered portion started to shrink, resulting in the relative rise in the level of expenditures. Nevertheless, 
following the divergence of the 1950s, in the discussed periods of fast growth, clear-cut convergence can 
be observed between Hungary and Western Europe in this area (Appendix).52  
If trends of social expenditures are measured by the broader method of calculation used by the OECD 
slightly different dynamics emerge both in terms of the changes in the Hungarian level and the differences 
between Hungarian and Western European levels.53 In 1960 11.3% of the GDP was spent on welfare purposes, 
which rose to 13.9%, 19.6% and 27.8% in 1970, 1980 and 1990, respectively.54 That is, the moderate rate of 
growth in the 60s was followed by a relatively sharp rise. The first half of the 1980s saw the reoccurrence of a 
slow down, almost equalling stagnation. At the end of the decade acceleration can be seen, which is obviously 
the result of recession in Hungary: for example, from 1989 to 1990, in the course of one year, the ratio of 
expenditures rose from 25.4% to 27. 8% .55  
In summary, in the period between 1960 and 1990 the relative level of social expenditures in Hungary 
was lagging far behind the Western European average. In 1960 it amounted to 70% of the Western European 
average, which was followed by a sharp then a moderate increase in the difference until in 1980 it was the same 
as two decades before. The fast growth in the second half of the 1980s was enough only to reach four-fifths of 
the West European average. Moreover, the gradual decrease in the variance in Western Europe also contributed 
to the divergence observed in the examined period between Hungary and Western Europe except for the last few 
years (Appendix). 
There is another problem, an even greater than the ones discussed above when comparing post-Second 
World War Hungarian and Western European welfare expenditures.56 It is a dilemma whether the subsidies to 
consumer prices, typical of communist countries and absorbing huge resources, should be included in social 
expenditures or not. In one, undoubtedly plausible argument, the ILO and OECD statistics often used in the 
comparative analysis of welfare systems reflect the principles underlying the welfare systems of Western 
countries and ignore the unique structure of social rights in communist countries.57 In these countries state 
subsidies for the prices of basic consumer goods and services was a major tool of welfare policy. The explicit 
goal of these measures, i.e. the improvement and nivellation of the purchasing power of incomes, was not unlike 
the other objectives to be realised by other means of welfare policy. However, we believe that including price 
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subsidies in welfare expenditures would also present considerable difficulties in the comparison, exactly because 
the principles underlying these subsidies differed so significantly from the principles behind welfare benefits 
discussed above. If the definition of welfare benefits was extended to include subsidies as well, it would be not 
welfare systems but complete social-economic systems that we were to compare. This, even disregarding the 
difficulties involved, is not our ambition. These subsidies served not only welfare purposes but had a more 
complex function, e.g. the support of inefficient firms and branches. Moreover, evidence from research shows 
that they had a moderate impact on social policy, primarily because affluent segments of the society had much 
better access to them than the average. Furthermore, in certain areas, such as  health care or consumption of 
basic foods resulted in the large-scale waste of resources. 58 
Price subsidies in communist Hungary definitely increased the expenditures of the national budget, 
although never grew so much out of proportion as in the GDR in the 80s, where the funds allocated for subsidies 
surpassed social security expenditures.59 The growth pattern of price subsidies was considerably different from 
the benefits of social policy. The growth, excluding housing benefits, was highest in the 50s, the 70s and in the 
first half of the 80s, and after reaching its peak in 1986-1987 it fell sharply.60 Including price subsidies in  
 
Hungarian welfare expenditures, we find its ratio to the GDP to equal or slightly exceed the level of the West 
European average in 1960, and, after a slow down, to reach it again and remain steady at this level until the end 
of the 1980s.61 
The structure of Hungarian social security expenditures diverged significantly from Western 
European patterns already fifteen years after World War II. Then the expenditures on pensions were 
especially low and funds allocated for family allowance were also way under Western European averages. 
For example, in 1960 38.7% of all expenditures were spent on pensions in Hungary compared to the 
Western European average of 50% and 12.2% on family allowance compared to the average level of 
17.3% in the West. In contrast with this, the ratio of health care expenditures was more than double the 
Western European average in this period. 
From the 1960s transformations reshaped the structure of Hungarian social security expenditures. 
First of all, while in Western Europe the ratio of resources allocated for cash and in kind benefits of health 
insurance significantly grew to reach 30.3% in 1980, doubling the ratio two decades before, in Hungary 
such expenditures halved. These opposing tendencies can be explained primarily by the lack of price 
explosion of this sphere in Hungary, i.e. the more rapid rise in health care-related costs than in other areas, 
mostly because of the introduction of new but expensive technologies took place in Western Europe but 
not in Hungary. In addition, the income levels of Hungarian health care workers relative to other 
occupational groups did not reach Western European standards, which also tempered expenditures. At the 
same time, situations of shortage resulting from the low level financing of health care urged the population 
to try to purchase higher quality health services within the free state health care system. This, paired with a 
decline in moral standards as a primary cause and with other factors, created institutionalised corruption in 
Hungarian health care, unknown in Western Europe. The sums channelled into heath care as a result of this 
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practice are estimated to reach 5-10% of all official expenditures (approx. 2-4 billion Forints) in the late 
1980s.62 
Parallel to the relative decrease of health expenditures, however, there is a convergence between 
Hungarian and Western European expenditures regarding pensions. While between 1960 and 1980 in 
Western Europe the ratio of pensions compared to other social security services changed only a little, in 
Hungary it grew steeply, approaching Western European levels. In part, this structural shift resulted from a 
continuous rise and the introduction of the indexation of pensions in Hungary, and, more  importantly, 
from the growth of the ratio of those eligible, which was related to the low retirement age even though 
negative mortality indices had an opposite effect.63 
From the 60s the high ratio of family and maternity benefits among expenditures as compared to 
Western Europe became an important characteristic of the Hungarian welfare system. This was primarily 
the consequence of a major drop of amounts allocated to family allowance in Western Europe, while in 
Hungary such expenditures grew, even if only moderately. In addition to family allowance, maternity leave 
assistance (”gyes”) was introduced in 1966, paid to mothers with infants in order to enable them to care for 
their children at  
 
home while preserving their job. Paid for the first two, then three years of the child’s life, the level of the 
assistance was not insignificant, especially compared to the average income of women workers with lower 
qualifications. In sum, the ratio of family and maternity benefits grew from 12.2% to 13.3% in social 
security expenditures between 1960 and 1980.64 A good illustration of the significance of these supports is 
that they amounted to 21% of all cash benefits, or one third of the amount paid on pensions in 1975. There 
is no similarly high ratio in the welfare programs of any Western European country. 
Another characteristic of the communist welfare system was the virtual lack of unemployment 
benefits. Although unemployment benefits were nominally introduced in 1957, until their termination in 
1988, such benefits were actually paid only in about 5000 cases.65 This lack was partly related to job 
security becoming a constitutionally guaranteed right in Hungary. Even more important, however, under 
the conditions of planned economy labour was subject to shortages like any other resource. With the 
exception of shorter periods and smaller settlements or regions, e.g. purely agrarian areas affected by 
collectivisation in the 1960s, those intending to take up a job could find one relatively easily and thus 
unemployment  did not exist until the end of the 1980s, or at least not in the Western European sense. Full 
employment made the institution of unemployment benefits dispensable, but the lack of such benefits was 
obviously also meant to urge people temporarily unemployed (e.g. because of being between jobs) to start 
a new job as soon as possible. In other words, this structural characteristic also reflected production related 
considerations as shown in other social security programs. The lack of unemployment benefits meant 
significant structural differences in welfare expenditures compared to Western Europe from the 1970s, 
when mass unemployment appeared there, amounting to as much as 18% of social security expenditures in 
some countries. In Hungary, no such expenditures were present – or, rather, they were covered by other 
institutions, e.g. companies, in the form of hidden or latent unemployment.66 
Though the present study follows welfare development through the example of social security and 
first of all its main component, social security, it seems necessary to highlight again a developmental trend 
beyond this. Compared to Western Europe, a significant structural difference in the realm of welfare 
resulted from the appearance of price subsidies in Hungary after World War II. This had not been 
unknown in Western Europe either, but, as shown earlier, in Hungary it amounted to a substantially higher 
proportion of welfare expenditures. While changes in the world economy resulted in the emergence of 
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mass unemployment in Western Europe in the early 1970s, in Hungary the same changes, or, rather, the 
intention of shutting these out caused a significant rise of price subsidies. In the late 1980s, however, their 
sum steeply decreased, which now meant a greater role given to cash benefits, as well as to state subsidies 
for special housing loans with reduced interests and in kind benefits in health care and education.67 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Social  Rights 
 
The present chapter focuses on the following dimensions of social rights: 1., the degree of coverage, that is 
how extensive is the coverage of social security schemes among the population or active earners; 2., 
qualifying conditions for social security benefits, that is what kind of conditions should be fulfilled to 
qualify for a benefit; and 3., the relative levels of benefits, that is how generous are the benefits of the 
schemes in comparison to the previous earnings of the recipient or to the average earnings in the society.68  
The first, pre-World War I forms of Western European social security were not comprehensive as 
regards the degree of coverage, since only a small proportion of the population or those employed received 
benefits. Perhaps the only exceptions are Germany and, in a certain respect, England and Denmark. In 
Germany the majority of the labour force had occupational injuries and pension insurance already at the 
turn of the century and the same applies to England with regard to occupational injuries insurance and 
Denmark to health insurance in 1910.69 
In the development of social rights, one of the most characteristic tendencies of the following 
decades was the gradual growth in the ratio of those receiving social security. This process greatly 
progressed in the interwar years, especially in Scandinavia, but development toward universality (the 
inclusion of the whole population in insurance schemes) accelerated especially after the Second World 
War. Complete coverage cannot be declared everywhere even at the end of the period examined but the 
levels reached were such by the late 1980s that Western European social security systems can be called 
mature in this respect, applying Peter Flora’s terminology.70 
The extension of social security eligibility progressed along two paths from the beginnings. One 
was the inclusion of ever widening groups of employees into insurance in their own right, the other was 
granting share for more and more people not in their own right as benefits were extended to relatives, 
primarily regarding health insurance, as well as to survivors, and the number of dependants was also 
considered in several other benefits. On the other hand, while political rights diffused principally top down 
in the social hierarchy in Western Europe, it was more or less the other way round regarding social 
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rights.71 Workers in the most dangerous occupations in the most important industries were first included in 
the programs, which were then extended to the other industrial workers, later to agricultural workers and to 
dependants, then to widows and orphans of the insured. The next step was extension to high earners and 
then those self-employed. The inclusion of the latter, especially farmers, was a complex process, partly 
because these groups themselves often rejected the burdens associated with social security. Finally other, 
non-employed social groups, e.g. students also became insured in their own right in several countries. 
Those living on the periphery of society were exceptions in this regard, sharing in  
 
 
these rights relatively late.72 This type of gradual extension primarily effected countries which had a 
Bismarckian insurance system. As a result of continuous expansion, almost the whole population became 
insured in time in several of these countries, e.g. West Germany, Austria and France by the 1970s.73 In 
contrast, in countries with the Beveridge type of welfare system, the growth of the coverage often took 
place abruptly. In Scandinavian countries and Great Britain several social security schemes were extended 
to the whole population in one step in the interwar period and after the Second World War. Furthermore, in 
Switzerland, which did not belong to this category, the whole population was included in old-age and 
survivors` pension insurance in 1946/48. 
Analysing the principles defining the qualifying conditions for welfare benefits, the dominance of 
two systems can be seen in the pre-Second World War period of social security: one determined by the 
type of work and depending on contribution; and another, means tested system. An example of the former 
is the benefits of pension insurance in Germany, for which only workers were eligible at first, and even 
then just in proportion to their contributions paid. In contrast, in several Scandinavian countries and Great 
Britain eligibility for state pension services depended on age and earnings. Such means tested state pension 
was first introduced in Denmark in the 1890s. Great Britain adopted for a similar means-tested pension 
system, not tied to previous contributions in 1908.74 
Later this double pattern of eligibility began to change. After the First World War the means-test 
temporarily gained ground but its importance started to fade in the interwar period and even more so in the 
second half of the century. For example, as regards old-age pensions in 1930 this principle was applied 
when determining eligibility in most of the countries, but after the war this practice was present only in 
about half, and then terminated everywhere by the 1980s, with the exception of supplementary pensions in 
Ireland, Switzerland and Italy.75 
In addition, the principle of citizenship as a factor guaranteeing eligibility for benefits emerged 
early. Sweden introduced a universal, contribution-based pension system in 1913. At this point it was 
rather of theoretical significance because it provided very low level services.76 However, citizenship 
gained a considerable practical role a few decades later, in the interwar period and especially in the years 
after the Second World War in the assertion of social rights. A part of this process was the introduction of 
health and pension insurance covering all citizens in Denmark; another important step was the reforms 
following and based on the Beveridge report in Great Britain. Here the citizenship-principle was clearly 
applied in the transformation of health insurance, the establishment of the National Health Service after the 
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Second World War. In spite of this, the great expansion of welfare systems in the two decades after the 
Second World War seems to have been based on former eligibility principles. It was only in the 1960s or, 
in other interpretations, in the 1970s, that citizenship was beginning to be considered as a determining 
factor in eligibility.77 This especially applies to the Danish,  
 
Swedish and Finnish systems, which belong to the welfare model often referred to as social democrat, in 
essence open to all relevant social groups. For example, in Denmark those self-employed could join 
voluntary unemployment insurance, just like they were eligible for the basic state pension having reached a 
certain age and on condition of being resident in the country for a defined period. Nevertheless, the 
supplementary state pension was tied to being actively engaged and paying contributions even here.78 
An increasing application of the citizenship principle in welfare eligibility does not mean, 
however, that equality of social rights in every aspects would have been even approximately complete in 
Western Europe in this period. On the contrary, in most countries benefits were tied to contributions paid 
and were also determined by occ3upational type. For example, in France social security systems gradually 
expanded and  merged, and the level of their services became more similar – but still, considerable 
differences remained all through the period between insured groups regarding the conditions for eligibility, 
with 12 occupationally distinct public pension schemes. At the end of the period examined Germany was 
another typical example of the welfare type referred to as conservative or corporatist, where also different 
social security systems existed for different occupational groups. Those employed in the private sector had 
their own insurance schemes, but, within this sector, there were separate systems for, e.g., agriculture, 
mining, or the self-employed. Belonging to a distinct social security scheme was part of the benefits of 
public employees.79 
At the same time, a convergence can be observed between the different eligibility systems. In the 
countries where universal and unified insurance existed, benefits were somewhat differentiated in relation 
to incomes, i.e. the contributions paid. This was the case in the United Kingdom and in Scandinavia 
between 1959 and 1966, where an earnings-related  supplementary pension was introduced besides the 
flat-rate state pension. In contrast, in countries where an earning-related pension system was in operation, 
flat-rate elements were introduced, e.g. in the Netherlands (1956), Italy (1965) and Germany (1972).80 
Later in the 1980s, the convergence continued, but rather on the bases of the ”workfare state” model, 
which implied an emphasis on entitlements tied to labour market position rather than citizenship.81 
The level of the benefits provided by early social security programs were rather modest and also 
quite static, because they were not connected to price changes or to the growth of earnings and economic 
output. This was even more the case because roughly until the Second World War it was not supposed that 
the beginning of the payment of pension benefits would coincide with retirement and therefore the pension 
alone would enable the insured to live off it alone.82 However, as an important development of social 
security, the benefits were approaching earnings levels, a process beginning on a small scale in the 
interwar period and then growing after the Second World War.83 Thus these relieved not only the most 
serious emergencies, but could increasingly contribute to the maintenance or approximation of the living 
standard and the relative social status of the insured. An instrument of this was the adjustment of benefits 
to growth in economic output and/or the income of the active population, thus offering a share of economic 
growth to inactive generations and those eligible for  
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benefits. Denmark introduced this principle in the pension system as early as 1933, but the other Western 
European countries adopted for it only between 1955 and 1965, the exceptions being Switzerland (1968) 
and Great Britain (1975).84 In the terminology of the 1957 German pension reform this meant the 
”dynamisation” of pensions,  being significant mostly because of its long term effects, but it also resulted 
in the immediate and radical rise of pensions, by 65.3% for workers and 71.9% for employees.85 In the 
next decades the same principle was applied to the other benefits in Germany (the latest being sick pay in 
1974) and other countries followed suit, though using different methods.86 
The changes in the levels of the two most significant cash benefits, pension and sick pay can be 
presented as good examples of the changes in the relative levels of benefits. Before the Second World War 
pensions were relatively modest amounts, afterwards, however, they increased rapidly, both regarding the 
minimum pension and the average worker pension. The average of minimum pension in 18 OECD 
countries, expressed in the percentage of wages in the processing industry, was 10% in 1930, 19% in 1950, 
25% in 1965, and 37% by 1985. It first reached 40% in Austria in 1960, and exceeded 50% in 1970 in the 
Netherlands and Denmark. By the 1980s this ratio was surpassed also by France and the other 
Scandinavian countries.87 The other index examined, the average worker pension amounted to 14% of the 
net average wages in the processing industry in this group of countries. This ratio doubled by 1950 to 
reach 43% by 1965, 50% by 1975 and 58% by 1985.88 There was no significant variation in this regard in 
the development of the Western European countries included in the present study, where in 1939 the 
average pension was about 12% of the average income of workers.89 In the 1930s the relative level of 
German and Italian average pensions was the highest. In 1950 pensions amounted to 20-30% of the 
average income of workers in Western Europe (1/3 in Denmark, 1/5 in Sweden, and 1/6 in Norway), and 
there were only a few countries where they exceeded its half (Austria and France). First in this regard since 
the Second World War, Austria was joined by Belgium only in the 1970s. In 1985 the average levels of 
pensions exceeded two-thirds of incomes in Austria, Belgium, Italy, Finland, Norway and Sweden. The 
lowest level (slightly below 50%) was found in Ireland. Altogether by then the Western European average 
itself was well above 50%.90 In parallel with this, the relative levels of pensions also converged in these 
countries. J. Palme finds convergence in the case of OECD countries as regards the levels of pensions after 
1930. Exceptions were the 50s, when the coefficient of variation temporarily grew, and the period between 
1975 and 1985, when no considerable change occurred in this respect.91 
Similarly to pensions, a dynamic growth can be observed in the levels of cash benefits of health 
insurance relative to wages, which nearly tripled between 1930 and 1985. In the latter point in time 90 to 
100% of wages were paid as sick leave in a number of Western European countries including Austria, 
Finland, Germany, Norway and Sweden. The lowest ratio of sick pay was given in Belgium, Great Britain 
and France.92 
 
 
 
Several researchers claim that trends observed in the development of social rights support the 
existence of a convergence in Western Europe in the development of social security, first of all in the post-
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Second World War period.93 Hartmut Kaelble regards the systems of the 1980s as ”highly uniform”.94 In 
accordance with this, our results also show a steady decrease in the differences in the coverage of the 
population in Western European countries over the 20th century (Appendix). In the early, pre-World War I 
period Germany, Denmark and the United Kingdom had a great advantage over the other countries, but 
already in the interwar years cross-country differences were significantly reduced. In this period the 
Northern countries (the United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark and Norway) had the highest growth rate in 
coverage, while Finland, Switzerland, France, Belgium and Italy stayed well under the average. After the 
Second World War Western European social security systems reached or approximated universality as 
regards the degree of coverage. In the mid 70s the majority of total work force did belong to social security 
systems almost in all Western European countries. This especially applies to health and pension insurance. 
The exceptions were Germany, Austria, Ireland and, regarding health insurance, the Netherlands, where 
10-20% of the work force, mostly those self employed were still not insured. Undoubtedly less important, 
occupational injuries insurance covered the majority of employees by a later period. After the Second 
World War convergence continued in the coverage: By the late 80s the coefficient of variation dropped to 
a very low level in health and pension insurance, signalling only slight differences in Western Europe in 
these areas (Appendix).95 The decrease of differences took place on a smaller scale in occupational injuries 
insurance, and was even less pronounced in unemployment insurance. This latter progressed through the 
slowest development and J. Alber did not find convergence in this regard.96 Moreover, in interpreting the 
processes it must be taken into consideration that there was complete coverage in certain types of 
insurance in several countries in the 60s, thus the smallest increase in the others could result in 
convergence.97 
As regards the qualifying conditions for welfare services, in the interwar period no clear tendency 
of convergence or the opposite can be seen in Western Europe, but after the Second World War forces 
pointing to growing similarity dominated. On the one hand, means tested services gradually faded to give 
ground to benefits granted on the basis of the insurance or the citizenship principle everywhere. Besides, 
the systems based on these two defining principles approached each other. The cash benefits of insurances 
universal for all citizens, most of all  pensions, were differentiated relative to incomes, thus moving closer 
to the principles of the traditional Bismarckian social security system. At the same time, in countries where 
the level of benefits depended on contributions, new, flat-rate elements were introduced for all who 
qualified. However, in the 1980s, the convergence of systems was realised rather on the basis of the 
insurance principle and the citizenship principle had smaller importance in this process. 
 
 
It was a new objective in the post-Second World War development of social security in Western 
Europe not only to relieve the most dire poverty, but to maintain the  level of income of the insured.98 
Accordingly, the level of services rapidly improved in all areas examined and, at least till the 70s, after 
which no clear trends emerge, the services insurances provided in different countries became increasingly 
similar. Besides the changes in the structures of expenditures, this is evidenced by the development of 
individual areas of social security, especially pensions. 
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*** 
 
Basic social security programs were introduced early (1892, 1907) in Hungary in a Western 
European comparison. However, at that time and for a long period following, these lagged behind the 
pioneering Western European countries considerably in their degree of coverage.99 This can be explained 
primarily by two factors. On the one hand, early programs applied to fewer social groups than in Western 
Europe. The benefits of the first schemes were applied to workers in the industry, commerce and groups of 
public employees. The considerable body of agricultural workers was excluded completely, as were private 
white-collar employees. On the other hand, social groups first to be insured in Western Europe and in 
Hungary, especially workers, represented a significantly smaller proportion of society in the latter. 
The earliest data are available on the degree of coverage in health insurance. In 1924, 
approximately one-fourth (24.8%) of active earners were eligible for sick pay in Hungary, while the ratio 
of those entitled to in kind benefits may have been somewhat higher.100 This rose only slightly by 1930 
(26.5%). At this point 39.3% of active earners had occupational injuries insurance and 16.1% had old-age 
insurance.101  
Though the extension of eligibility progressed in the interwar years and during the Second World 
War, reforms did not point primarily in this direction. Instead of significant improvements in coverage, the 
level of benefits was raised and, especially with the introduction of pension insurance, additional risks 
were covered for groups already insured. Thus all the elements of the Hungarian social security system 
(accident, health and pension insurance) applied only to industrial, mining, commerce and transportation 
workers and domestic servants even after the 1927 and 1928 reforms. It must be noted, though, that the 
family members of the insured also enjoyed relatively extensive rights. Near relations (wife and children), 
the woman keeping the household of the insured or siblings without independent earning were also 
qualified for the benefits of compulsory health insurance, and the orphans’ allowance was paid generously 
up to age 24 in case the orphan was engaged in  
 
 
studies.102 By the Second World War compulsory occupational injuries insurance was extended to 
apprentices. Health insurance now covered them as well as domestic servants but not higher paid members 
of specific occupational groups. Old-age and disability pensions covered even smaller numbers. In this 
case, although the earning limit of private white-collar employees was different which mandated 
membership for a higher proportion of this group, for other important occupational categories (e.g. public 
employees, railway employees with company insurance, etc.) it was not compulsory to join the scheme.103 
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In most Western European countries certain benefits of social security had already been extended 
to agricultural workers before, during or immediately after the First World War (e.g. health insurance in 
Germany in 1886 and 1911, in Great Britain and Ireland in 1911, in Norway in 1915 and Austria in 
1921).104 This makes it especially striking that in Hungary agricultural workers, who significantly 
outnumbered those in the industry, were only partly covered by social security, moreover, for certain 
agricultural groups even this was completely missing.105  
Only the number of those covered by pension insurance increased dynamically in Hungary in the 
interwar period. On the eve of the Second World War health insurance was available for about 1/4 of the 
active population, while pension insurance covered slightly less than one third, and occupational injuries 
insurance somewhat more. These figures appear low in a Western European comparison, though ratios 
were similar in Finland, Belgium and Switzerland. Therefore the changes in the population covered by 
insurance followed the Bismarckian pattern until the Second World War regarding both the groups insured 
first and the dynamics of extension. Similarly to Germany, in Hungary it was workers who first received 
the benefits of social security and expansion was a process spanning several decades. 
Regarding the qualifying conditions for social security benefits in the first half of the century it 
was clearly the type of occupation and the contribution paid that played a definitive role in Hungary. 
Means-test hardly existed neither in the earliest programs nor after the 1928 pension reform. The 
conditions for pensions in 1930 (the age limit and waiting period) largely corresponded to the Western 
European practice, though the latter cannot be labelled unified.106 Exceptions include perhaps the 
regulation applied to the blind, which was more favourable than the average and the unfavourable payment 
conditions of old-age pensions and widows’ allowances. The latter was unfavourable because it required a 
relatively long, 20 year waiting period, consequently, considering the introduction of 1928, no payments 
were made in this program between the wars. In addition, the prospective amount of pensions strongly 
depended on the length of the contribution period in Hungary, more markedly than elsewhere. At the same 
time, in contrast to most Western European countries, there was no waiting period required for health 
insurance in Hungary. 
For industrial workers, health and occupational injuries insurance guaranteed rather high level 
services in Hungary already from 1891 and 1907, respectively. Although in the period of economic 
disorganisation and inflation following the world war social rights were difficult to realise, the 1927 social 
security legislation  
 
 
reinforced them. The 1928 pension insurance law introduced similarly high level benefits for industrial and 
commercial employees.107 
The relative level of the benefits is well illustrated by the regulation of health insurance and 
sickness payments. In the early 1930s Hungarian industrial workers received 60% of their wages as sick 
pay from the 4th day of their illness, or, if their scheme could afford it, this could rise to 75%.108 
Consequently, sick pay exceeded the German, French and Belgian levels, and only in the Netherlands can 
a more favourable service be found.109 Furthermore, Béla Kovrig’s surveys indicate that the interwar 
Hungarian regulation was considerably better than the conditions guaranteed with regard to health benefits 
by the 1948 British social security legislation.110 Of course, all this concerns the relative level of benefits, 
as compared to wages, and not the absolute level of services. In an international context further features of 
the conditions of payment appear pioneering. As regards old-age pension, a contemporary calculation 
suggests that around 1930 Hungarian old-age pensions and disability benefits, based on 30 years of 
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contributions would be 477 Pengős, equalling the Austrian level converted into Pengő. Taking 40 years 
into account (596 Pengős) it significantly exceeded Austrian and Italian levels, equalled Czechoslovakian 
services but was under the English and especially the German level.111  
  
The development of social rights in Hungary between the Second World War and 1990 was 
determined by a combination of different factors, such as the Bismarckian traditions of the previous 
periods, political discrimination, and solidarity or the principle of citizenship. These elements gained 
different weights from time to time and their significance also varied in different areas of welfare 
influencing both the relationship to the previous period and to Western European trends. 
The extension of coverage was almost continuous in the post-Second World War period, though 
three major waves can be distinguished, the first following the war, the second in the late 50s and early 
60s, and the third in the mid- and late-70s.112 As a result the pattern of growth of coverage occupied a mid-
position: it was not so abrupt in Hungary as had been earlier in several Scandinavian countries or in Great 
Britain, but was not so gradual either as in the majority of countries following Bismarckian traditions. 
(Appendix) 
In the development of the qualifying conditions of social security there are discontinuities 
between the interwar and the post-Second World War periods in several respects. As an element of this, 
the political discrimination of certain social groups had already appeared immediately after the war, which 
affected qualifying conditions and existed for decades, even though it was gradually losing its weight. 
Discrimination primarily affected the agricultural population. From the late 50s the agricultural population 
also became insured, but was not granted rights equal to those who worked in the state sector. However, 
the divide in social rights was not only drawn between the self- and state employed. There were privileged 
categories within the latter group as well, depending on what importance rulers attributed to them with 
regard to the production process or to the preservation of their own power. Certain occupations (e.g. 
soldiers and miners) enjoyed benefits much more advantageous than others in the 50s; and several of these 
privileges had been maintained for decades (e.g. age limits in pension qualifications). The loss of social 
rights previously secured and other forms of discrimination  
 
were in sharp contrast with the practice of the interwar period as well as with contemporary Western 
Europe, where the inclusion of the self employed in insurance was slow but the extension of social rights 
did not take place at the expense of any other groups.113 
At the same time, from the very beginnings of the communist transformation of the welfare 
system, the unification of qualifying conditions on the basis of solidarity was a clear tendency. First these 
applied only to or within certain groups, primarily in the case of state employees, and thus, paradoxically, 
they coexisted with the discrimination of certain other groups. In time, however, state employment and 
coverage increased, leading to the loss of ground for discrimination. The gradual unification of qualifying 
conditions also provided the basis for granting benefits on the citizenship principle. 
The mid 1970s can be seen as a turning point in the regulation of qualifications, principally 
because in 1975 health care and the assimilated occupational injuries insurance become citizenship rights. 
This meant the realisation of universality in the broadest sense in health care with not only insurance 
coverage for the whole society but also theoretically the same levels of services with the exception of the 
cash benefits already mentioned.114 This was obviously a favourable change compared to the interwar 
period, even though the elimination of the waiting period in health and industrial occupational injuries 
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insurance as well as the unlimited period of the payments could be regarded universal in Western Europe, 
too, at this time. Also by this time, the differences between employees and other insured groups had 
disappeared with regard to qualifying for pension.  
Besides the signs of discontinuity, i.e. the ideologically rooted discrimination and the introduction 
of benefits based on the citizenship principle, continuity with the interwar period is also clear in the area of 
qualifying conditions. On the one hand, similarly to the earlier period, the means-test principle was not 
given a significant role after the Second World War in state welfare provisions, and its significance further 
diminished with the dissolution of voluntary charity organisations and other welfare institutions.115 
On the other hand, though benefits were paid increasingly by the same principles for the whole 
population, among which the citizenship as a source of rights was clearly gaining ground in some welfare 
areas, these principles also showed unambiguous continuity with the pre-1945, Bismarckian traditions 
based on individual insurance. A proof of this is that for decades the precondition for all social security 
benefits was the payment of contributions, or, rather, being employed. The inclusion of great numbers of 
farmers in social security schemes from the late 1950s was possible because they had ceased to be self 
employed and became employees of state farms or joined agricultural cooperatives. Universality with 
regards to the in kind benefits of health insurance emerged also at the time when the private sector 
virtually disappeared and the distinction between cooperative and state ownership became insignificant. 
This provides further support for the important role of the workplace and especially the status of state 
employment in qualifying for social rights.116 
In contrast to health insurance, the pension system preserved such important features of the 
Bismarckian insurance system as compulsory contribution, relatively long waiting periods and, 
consequently, the  
 
differentiated calculation of pensions until the end of the period examined. Other benefits of social 
security, e.g. sick pay were also associated with contributions and calculated on the basis of one’s income. 
In addition, family benefits, which played an important role in the Hungarian welfare system, also 
depended on employment and contributions. These characteristics are similar to those appearing in the 
conservative Western European welfare systems of Germany, Austria and the Benelux countries. 
With respect to the level of benefits, efforts in the post-Second World War years seem to have 
been principally directed at a strong levelling off, rather than a general improvement of standards. This 
meant, for example in the case of pensions, evening out differences between public employees and other 
occupational groups. A procedure springing from strong political motivations used the assessment of 
political reliability as a pretext and employed administrative means to decrease or nullify qualifications 
already secured in the case of those formerly in public service and their relatives. In addition, financial 
measures were taken to eliminate differences in benefits which were regarded as excessive.117 
In spite of the politics of levelling off, the employment and the corresponding social security 
contribution was decisive in the determination of the level of benefits in this period, and later the 
moderation of the differences in benefits was attributed not a priority at all. The most important elements 
of cash benefits were linked to earnings even at the end of the period examined, as shown by the 
calculation methods of pensions and sick pay.  
The emphasised role of work and employment in the benefits of social programs was reflected in 
the more generous regulation of benefits of occupational injuries insurance, which directly resulted from 
work. In the early 1980s occupational injuries insurance did not require a waiting period and guaranteed a 
100% income replacement. 
Considering the low retirement age limit it is noteworthy that the relative levels of Hungarian 
pensions increased significantly by the early 1980s compared to the very low post-Second World War 
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levels. The 57% ratio in 1982 practically equalled the average of OECD countries (58%) and was 
considerably above that of communist countries, e.g. the GDR (30%) and even Czechoslovakia (45%).118 
An obvious explanation here is that, unlike other communist countries, pensions in Hungary were 
continuously raised (indexed) from the 1960s on. This raise was a fixed amount for a long time, e.g. 2% 
p.a. and a minimum 70 Forints between 1972 and 1986. The galloping inflation of the 80s, however, made 
this increasingly insufficient. Therefore repeated ad hoc measures were taken to preserve the purchasing 
power of pensions, with less and less success and with consequences to the relative level of average 
pensions.119 
 
 
4., Organization and Control 
 
In contrast with the areas analysed above, the issues of who and in what arrangement administers the social 
security system and who exerts the final control over it have drawn little attention in international welfare 
research. The fact that the communist transformation of the welfare system brought about considerable changes  
 
in this area as well justifies the inclusion of these aspects in our inquiry. Accordingly, the following aspects will 
be discussed in the present chapter: 1. the organizational forms of social security, with special emphasis on the 
role of the state; and, closely related to this, 2. the functioning of control  mechanisms, that is, what scope of 
control the organizational framework offered over clients, and vice versa, what means those who were eligible 
had at their disposal to control the operation of social security. 
At the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, a period hallmarked by the dissolution of 
the traditional forms of social protection, mutual insurance associations, independent of state intervention were 
real alternatives to state welfare systems in Western Europe.120 The emergence of the German Hilfskassen auf 
Gegenseitigkeit, the English Friendly Societies, the French mutualités and their Belgian, Swiss and other 
counterparts preceded the first governmental welfare measures.121 These voluntary institutions had several 
shortcomings, though. In terms of their organisation, being fragmented in nature, they were too small to share 
risks effectively. Moreover, the service they provided covered only a small circle of risks (e.g. they provided no 
old-age pension), the standard of services was low, and only available for more well-to-do members of the workers’ elite, those who did have the capacity for advance savings. 
The intervention of the state can be regarded as a response to these problems. It unfolded at a different 
pace and in diversified ways in the Western European countries, resulting in considerable differences regarding 
the organizational forms of the early, pre-First World War social security systems. One of the major types was 
referred to as compulsory insurance, where the state mandated membership in a specific form of insurance 
without prescribing the actual company that the client was to take out the insurance policy with. Beside 
Germany, this arrangement was characteristic of the Austrian and Norwegian system in the pre-First World War 
                                                 
118 Therborn, European Modernity and Beyond. 94. 
119 Gabor Hegyesi, Anna Gondos and Eva Orsos, Hungary. In John Dixon and David Macarov eds., Social 
welfare in socialist countries. London and New York, 1992. 113.; Andorka-Tóth, Szociális kiadások és 
szociálpolitika Magyarországon. 415. 
120 Gerhard A. Ritter, Social Welfare in Germany and Britain. Origins and Development. Leamington Spa/New 
York, 1986. 134. 
121 Kaelble, A Social History of Western Europe. 80-81.; Ogus, Landesbericht Grossbritannien. 299.; Saint-
Jours, Landesbericht Frankreich. 204.; Maurer, Landesbericht Schweiz. 764. 
period, and it can also be detected in the British social security system from 1908 onwards. Both the German and 
the British systems integrated voluntary insurance institutions, of which existed in great numbers by then but, 
nevertheless, respected their independence.122 
The other type, state subsidised voluntary insurance was typical of Belgium, France, Italy, Sweden, 
Denmark and Switzerland initially. Here the state played a much less dominant role, limited to defining the 
operational framework of the social security system, controlling and subsidising its operation. The right to define 
the scope of benefits, other conditions of  payment, and the amount of contributions was left with the individual 
insurance fund. Benefits were proportionate to contributions paid. Vertical re-distribution between social strata 
was modest, however, unlike with private insurance, contributions were calculated irrespective of individual 
risks, that is, solidarity prevailed in this regard.123 
Between the two world wars the economic intervention of the state became more extensive throughout 
Western Europe, which also affected the role the state undertook in welfare provisions. Mostly as a result of 
governmental and legislative initiatives, compulsory insurance became more widespread at the expense of 
voluntary insurance schemes. On the one hand, already existing voluntary, state subsidised social security 
schemes were transformed into compulsory ones and newly introduced programs were compulsory from the 
start. Beside compulsory insurance thus becoming dominant, in most countries (Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy,  
 
etc.) a new type, national insurance also appeared on the scene. This type of insurance covers the whole 
population and is administered by the state, thus gaining a more central role here than in earlier types of social 
security programs. The national programs are co-financed by the clients resembling the insurance schemes. 
However, there is only a weak relationship between the contributions or special taxes paid and the benefits 
received. The Swedish social security system was the first one to have been organised along these lines in 1913, 
followed by other Scandinavian countries introducing national pension schemes between the two world wars.124 
Beyond Scandinavia there were new benefits introduced in several other countries, exclusively financed by the 
state, such as family allowance and unemployment benefit in Germany in the 1930s.125 
After the Second World War different types of compulsory or national insurance requiring a 
considerable state involvement were introduced even in countries and for risk groups that had only voluntary 
insurance up to that point. Compulsory occupational injuries scheme was set up in France (1946), Great Britain 
(1946), Ireland (1966) and Belgium (1971), compulsory health  insurance in Belgium (1944), Sweden (1953) 
and Finland (1963) and compulsory pension insurance in Ireland (1960). Following in the wake of Scandinavian 
countries, national pension insurance was introduced in Great Britain, the Netherlands  and Switzerland. Great 
Britain, Italy and the Scandinavian countries also restructured their health insurance along the principles of 
national  insurance. By the beginning of the 1980s, the various types of voluntary occupational injuries, health 
and pension insurance were superseded, Switzerland was the only to maintain such forms in the first two areas. 
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Unemployment insurance still remained an exception to this trend, as compulsory forms did not become 
widespread in this area in Western Europe.126 
These social security systems, especially the national insurance, shifted more responsibility to the state 
in terms of both administrative operation and control. The spreading of national insurance schemes, however, 
was not a steady process. The model sometimes referred to as continental started gaining ground at the expense 
of state-administered systems from the 1970s. In this, social security systems were increasingly constructed 
along the principles of insurance and was overwhelmingly financed by the contributions of employers and 
employees.127 The prevalence of the insurance principle is supported by the fact that state contributions to the 
expenditures of social security were rather limited in most of the countries in the period after the Second World 
War. Our calculations suggest that the average state contribution to the financing of social security remained 
unchanged in Western Europe between 1960 and 1980, being 39.7% and 40% in the opening and the closing 
year, respectively (Appendix).128 True, the average evens out significant differences between the individual 
countries: in Great Britain, Ireland and the Scandinavian countries it was well above the average, as in these 
countries an average of 60% of social security expenditures were financed from state resources not only in the 
above discussed period but also between 1949 and 1974.129 Although our calculations reveal neither convergence 
nor divergence in the sample as regards the ratios of contributions between 1960 and 1980, other studies  
 
 
highlight the similar methods of financing and diagnose convergence for the 1980s.130 The state also provided 
incentives for forms of private insurance to expand, for example, in the form of tax breaks,131 however, its role 
increased in terms of providing the legal framework and administration and not in terms of financing social 
security in Western Europe in the decades after the Second World War. 
The emergence of social security was a great move compared to 19th century poor laws in that it was 
free from their repressive and stigmatising features. Nevertheless, the operation of social security was 
characterised by mechanisms of discipline and control as well. The aim of these mechanisms was to motivate 
clients to pay the contributions on the one hand and, on the other, to detect those who wanted to take advantage 
of the benefits but not qualified for them. 
These control mechanisms became more relaxed on the long run. For example, the various time limits 
loosened up: waiting periods became shorter, maximum periods of entitlements became longer or were 
eliminated altogether. In Germany, for example, for all the four major social security programs waiting periods 
decreased or were abolished between the time of their introduction and the mid-1970s.132 However, the trend of 
decreasing control, as pointed out in the previous chapter, holds primarily for the beginning and the middle of 
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the century, after which it stopped, to give way again to the trend of stricter control of receiving services 
prevailed alongside with the establishment of a new, extensive organizational network of this control in welfare 
states. The term ”welfare crime” illustrates the link between the welfare state and the institutions of state control. 
This became a central theme of the public discourse on the welfare state in the 70s and 80s, when there was less 
of a social consensus on welfare programs than before. The lack of consensus in tandem with the increase of tax 
burdens and the increasing complexity of fiscal legislation resulted in more willingness to tax avoidance.133 The 
state at this stage was already facing problems fulfilling its extensive welfare responsibilities, therefore, it made 
more efforts to fight ”welfare crime”, which manifested itself in the establishment of a number of new 
institutions of inspection and control.134 
The increased engagement of the state in the security schemes, and in welfare services in general did 
not necessarily limit the citizens’ scope of action, as it is not so much the degree of state participation  than its 
nature that is of major importance. It is not only that the prerequisite for exercising the social rights requires 
reliable and transparent operation of social security and other welfare organisations, which state measures aimed 
at on often not transparent insurance markets. It is also that states directly intervened to help the insured to exert 
control over the schemes. Laws passed at the early stage of development institutionalised the participation of 
contributors in the management in several countries, which was a major claim of the workers’ movement, too.135  
 
 
 
 
Employers and employees of other countries obtained a major role not only in financing but also in operating 
welfare institutions.136 
Participatory administration, however, did not become the dominant and effective means of control in 
Western Europe either in the first half of the century or after First World War. Especially in the second half of 
the century, in parallel with the increasing coverage of the population by social security, i.e. the increasing 
complexity of the systems, the indirect control of the clients over welfare programs through the institutions of 
political democracy became of great importance beside, or, rather, instead of the direct control of social security 
institutions. A significant part of the welfare research consider the institutions of political democracy as crucially 
important in the emergence and expansion of the welfare state, maintaining that this development directly 
resulted from left-wing parties articulating the interests of the working class assuming power.137 Even if a direct 
connection cannot be clearly found between the expansion of welfare services and specific political wings, mass 
democracy can obviously be regarded an important determining factor of this process in Western Europe.  
Summing up, the organizational forms of social security became more alike in Western Europe in the 
course of the 20th century. There were considerable differences at the beginning of the century and between the 
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two world wars ranging from state supported voluntary to compulsory and national schemes. Convergence began 
in the interwar period, then it gathered momentum after the Second World War. As part of this process, 
voluntary schemes were transformed into compulsory in an increasing number of countries, and national systems 
also took shape in Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, and Scandinavia. Consequently, voluntary insurances contracted 
by the 1970s and only the other two types operated. On the other hand, the growth rate of national schemes and 
state subsidies came to a limit, which is also illustrated by the trends in the sources of financing. After this point 
Beveridge-type systems introduced more elements of the insurance principle thus converging to the structure of 
the Continental welfare model. 
The increasing role of the state in welfare did not exclude the right of the clients to exercise control, 
what is more, from the very beginnings state regulation often aimed at transparency and providing contribution 
payers with opportunities to protect their own interests. Although there no empirical research is available in this 
area, several signs indicate throughout the 20th century there were considerable differences between the 
institutionalisation of direct control of the clients in Western European countries. With the expansion and 
growing complexity of the welfare systems after the Second World War, direct control lost importance and 
indirect control through the converging institutions of political democracy became of increasing importance.  
 
*** 
 
The first social security laws in Hungary openly relied on German and Austrian models, which also 
manifested itself in the regulation of organizational issues. Social security programs took the form of compulsory 
insurance already at the initial stage of development regarding health and occupational injuries insurance for 
industry workers  (1891: XIV.tc.; 1907: XIX.tc.) and the same form was applied to the pension insurance set up 
between the two world wars (1928: XL.tc.).  Agricultural workers were an exception to this, regulations  
 
 
introducing voluntary  insurance for them (1900: XVI.tc., 1902: XIV.tc.), which was modified before the Second 
World War when compulsory insurance for this social group had been partially established (1938: XII.tc.).138 
The compulsory health insurance of 1891 created a fragmented system along the principles of self-
government, features that the Hungarian social security system shared with its German counterpart. In 1892 there 
were 92 legally acknowledged health benefit funds, their number growing to 409 by 1906.139 Moreover, there 
were various forms of funds to choose from, such as district, crafts union, mine, company, and others. The high 
costs due to the fragmented nature of the system and the lack of transparency that caused hitches in the operation 
of the system resulted in the Health and Accident Insurance Act (1907) that made attempts to centralise the 
institutions of social security. The various types of funds were merged and only the operation of three types of 
funds was allowed: that of mine mutual funds, company and district funds. Moreover, the Országos 
Munkásbetegsegélyező és Balesetbiztosító Pénztár (National Fund for the Aid of Sick Workers and Accident 
Insurance, OMBP) was established, which administered the operation of district and company funds in 
accordance with national standards. The costs of its operation were covered by the state as well as the costs of 
                                                 
138 For social security legislation, see Gyáni, A szociálpolitika múltja Magyarországon. 11-14.; Laczkó, A 
magyar munkás- és társadalombiztosítás története. 151-155.  
139 Bikkal, A társadalombiztosítás Magyarországon. 344-345. 
administration of the controlling body, Állami Munkásbiztosítási Hivatal (State Office of Workers’ Insurance, 
ÁMH). However, not only the individual funds but also the OMBP continued under their respective self-
governments.140 
Further legislation was also hallmarked by centralisation, and by 1930 all industrial workers and 
domestic servants belonged to the same institution of health and pension insurance (Országos 
Társadalombiztosító Intézet, National Social Security Institute, OTI) which provided equal rights for them. 
There were only a few sectors (the railways, the post, the tobacco industry and mining) that managed to preserve 
their own, independent institution of social security. Therefore, at this stage the organizational form of 
Hungarian social security was considerably different from the German system, which continued to be 
decentralised. 
In the first half of the century the state in Hungary had the role of the organiser and supervisor of 
welfare programs, while the direct role of the state as provider of welfare services was far less significant. In 
accordance with the Bismarckian tradition, social security was subsidised by the state to a small extent.  2.4 
million Pengős p.a. were allotted in the budged for contributing to the operational costs of the OTI and the other 
major fund, the MABI (Magánalkalmazottak Biztosító Intézete, Institute of Insurance for Private Employees), 
which sum accounted for less than 2% of their total expenditures in 1930. The social security Act of 1928 
proposed a higher percentage of support, continuously increasing by 5% p.a. for social security regarding the 
old-age pension and the disability allowance but the dissolution of the Ministry of Welfare and Labour in 1932 
prevented the launch of this project.141 
The first Hungarian act of social security already created self-governments of social security  funds and 
these institutions were heavily relied on by laws passed later. Although self-government were temporarily 
abolished after the 1918-19 revolutions, but the need for them re-emerged when drafting the reform of social 
security in the second half of the 1920s, supported not only by József Vass, the Minister of Welfare and Labour  
 
but also by Prime Minister István Bethlen.142 Act XXI of 1927 therefore reintroduced the self-government of 
social security funds by insured employees and their employers. They elected self-governments in the OTI, the 
MABI, operating in Budapest and its environs, the Magyar Hajózási Betegség Biztosító Intézet [Hungarian 
Health Insurance Institute for Shipping] and the miner’s mutual funds. 
The election process in the new regulations were in many respects more democratic than before. In the 
first election taking place in 1929 employees and employers delegated members of national and district self-
government bodies by a secret and direct ballot.143 These bodies of self-government had a real control over social 
security in the 1930s, making decisions regarding contributions of insurance, qualifying conditions for social 
security benefits and supervised the work of the administration. The state, however, had considerable control 
rights, too. The constitution was to be approved by the minister of domestic affairs, who supervised the self-
governments and had the right to dissolve them in the case of a legal offence. The administrative body comprised 
of public servants, who, therefore, were entitled to appropriate protection and were responsible to the minister. 
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The government had the right to veto the budget of the self-government, its investment policy, the operation of 
health and other institutions of the self-government.144 The government had a similar but more limited control 
over the company pension funds.145 As a result, self-governments of social security funds in Hungary exercised 
their control function just as effectively as their Western European counterparts in the 1930s. Self-governments 
could even do some actual work for some time during the Second World War, assessing qualifications and the 
amount of benefits and participating in the definition of the funds’ investment policies.146 
 
The communist takeover brought about fundamental changes in the organizational form of the 
Hungarian social security system. The most striking difference in terms of organizational transformation was the 
fast and practically complete centralisation of the social security system rather concentrated between the two 
world wars anyway. The first step was the unification of OTI and MABI in 1949, followed by the merger of 
other independent institutions such as the OTBA (Országos Tisztviselői Betegsegélyezési Alap, National Clerk’s 
Health Insurance Fund), company pension funds, etc., with the exception of the social security institutions of the 
railways.147 And, more importantly, in accordance with the exclusive responsibility of the state, the fundamental 
principle of  the communist welfare system, social security, the major welfare program, had been taken under 
state control already by the end of the 1940s, and from 1950 onwards social security funds  were administered by 
the SZOT (Szakszervezetek Országos Tanácsa, National Council of Trade Unions) and the SZTK 
(Szakszervezeti Társadalombiztosítási Központ, Social Security Centre of Trade Unions), the latter fulfilling its 
task with through local branches. The SZOT had practically no authority to make decisions and was only an  
 
 
 
administrative executive body. The social security budget was incorporated in the national budget, that is, 
contributions and expenditures were not administered separately.148 
The organizational form of social security had been restructured many times. In 1964 the SZOT 
Társadalombiztosítási Főigazgatósága (SZOT Central Administration for Social Security) was established, 
taking over the responsibilities of SZTK alongside with some governmental tasks, such as the drafting of social 
security laws or supervision. In 1984, social security related responsibilities of trade unions were taken over by 
Országos Társadalombiztosítási Főigazgatóság (National Central Administration for Social Security), now a 
formal governmental body. However, despite all these changes, social security was kept under exclusive state 
control until the fall of the communist regime. Social security expenditures were separated again from the 
national budget only as late as 1989, and a year later the national health service was also financed by the social 
security schemes. 
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The increasing role of the state after the Second World War is reflected by the distribution of social 
security revenues. As we showed earlier prior to the Second World War only a small percentage of these came 
from the national budget, which then increased to 37.1% and 43.6% by 1960 and 1980, respectively. This 
basically conforms to Western European figures, however, with the role of the state as an employer also taken 
into account, Hungarian figures will significantly surpass Western European ones. The change in the 
contributions paid by employees is another sign of the new welfare concept of the state. Prior to 1945, with the 
exception of accident contribution, which was completely covered by employers, half of the contributions was 
paid by the employee, which fell to 13-15% in the coming years and both in 1960 and 1980 their level was 
lagging well behind West European figures in proportion to the total revenues of social security schemes 
(Appendix).149  
At the end of the 1940s, communist Gleichschaltung eliminated all types of control over social security 
by self-governments, and these institutions, were not restored again in the communist era. The central role 
assigned to trade unions in the operation of the welfare system meant, by definition, the violation of the self-
government principle, as qualification for social security and trade union membership did not necessarily 
coincide. Although trade unions and their local branches could have represented interests of thee social security 
clients, having acted as ”transmission belt” of the communist party, they were incapable of fulfilling this task. 
Regarding the control-rights of the clients of social security, it was even of higher importance than the lack of 
self-governments, that the state operating the system was not subject to democratic control either, a unique 
feature as compared to the practices of Western European countries. Although the communist regime obviously 
made efforts to consider the interests of those eligible, no democratic mechanisms institutionalised to articulate 
these interests. The communist leadership was hostile even in the era of soft dictatorship to all initiatives that 
questioned its monopoly – or, rather, its claim to monopoly – in welfare in any way. Authorities, for example, 
deployed police forces in the 1970s to isolate and eliminate the SZETA (Szegényeket Támogató Alap, Fund 
Aiding the Poor), a civil initiative.150 
In tandem with the organizational merging of social security into the party state bureaucracy, control 
mechanisms of the social security system over the clients also took new forms, moreover, social security became  
 
 
part of the mechanism of control and discipline of the one-party state.151 ”Sick pay tricksters” and ”pretenders”, 
those not qualifying for social  security benefits and still obtaining them, had been fought against already at an 
early stage, from the speech of Mátyás Rákosi at the Third Congress of the Communist Party in 1948. The 
intervention of authorities resulting in a long sequence of prosecutions intensified in the following years, with 
more than 6,000 prosecutions of social security frauds initiated by the authorities in 1952 alone. After 1954 the 
system became less repressive and prosecutions became scarce but the problem of welfare frauds reappeared on 
the agenda of the regime from time to time in the next few decades.152 
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 5. Summary 
 
In this study we examined the development of welfare systems in Hungary and Western Europe in the 
course of the so-called ”short 20th century” (1918-1990) from a long term comparative perspective. An 
effort was made to incorporate important characteristics besides the changes in expenditures most 
frequently analysed in the literature and to focus on aspects of analysis allowing for long term 
investigations as well as the assessment of the dynamics of changes and not biased regarding any welfare 
system. Accordingly, the most important areas under investigation included the relative levels of social 
expenditures, the basic structural characteristics of welfare institutions, social rights, organisational forms 
of welfare programs and the realisation of the right to control by the clients of welfare schemes. 
 Convergent and divergent processes between Hungarian and Western Europe were in the focus of 
our comparison. In addition, largely due to practical considerations, such as the availability of data, it was 
not the whole of the welfare sector we analysed. Rather, we primarily compared the development of social 
security systems. Although this may lessen the validity of the results regarding the whole welfare systems, 
we believe that the central significance of the areas targeted makes them appropriate to show major 
tendencies of the development of the welfare sector. 
 The comparison we carried out was asymmetrical in its nature. As a result we could study 
individual Western European societies to a considerably lesser degree than Hungary. The comparison, 
however, made it possible to refine  some of the existing notions of 20th century Hungarian welfare 
development and might contribute to a new interpretation of welfare both in the interwar and communist 
period.   
 One result of such significance is related to the level of welfare benefits in the first half of the 20th 
century. Due to the lack of appropriate data and methodological problems both in the case of Hungary and 
Western Europe, considerable difficulties arise in the comparison of welfare expenditures. Still, based on 
the definitions of welfare services most often applied by international organisations (ILO and OECD) and 
in international research, it can be stated that although Hungary did lag behind Western Europe in welfare 
expenditures relative to the GDP all through the period examined, the difference is smaller between the 
world wars – and greater in the second half of the century – than has been supposed in the scarce literature 
on the  
 
 
subject. Furthermore, when also taking into account the benefits of those in public employment, 
expenditure levels appear high even in a Western European comparison in the interwar period. 
 Nevertheless, due to the lack of long-term data sets it is hard to make any definitive statements about 
the first half of the century regarding the convergence/divergence of Western European and Hungarian welfare 
expenditures. Considering trends in Germany, intensifying Hungarian welfare legislature in the late 1920s and in 
the 1930s as well as the welfare programs launched in this period provide sufficient grounds only to formulate 
the hypothesis that social insurance and social security expenditures in Hungary converged to those of Western 
Europe in the 1930s. 
In the pre-Second World War period the developmental direction of Hungarian welfare 
institutions coincided with Western European trends. On the one hand, the early introduction of social 
security in comparison with Western Europe and the timing of programs in accordance with Western 
European trends made social security and the assimilated schemes the most important instrument of 
welfare policy in Hungary, too. In addition, convergence, but at least similarity can be seen in the 
differentiation of social security programs and in the structure of social security. Although the pace of 
differentiation is difficult to measure, the maturing of health insurance in Hungary in the first half of the 
century is obvious, which considerably expanded the types of services financed by social security even in a 
Western European comparison. Similarly to many countries in Western Europe, the growth of expenditures 
on pensions was the most rapid in Hungary, too, making it the most important among the programs. 
The comparison of the social security development of interwar Hungary and Western Europe in 
the area of social rights reveals a dichotomy. On the one hand, the available data indicate that the ratio of 
those covered by social security schemes was rather low in Hungary, and diverged from the Western 
European level. On the other hand, however, the relative level of benefits, especially as regards state 
employees largely approached the conditions in Western Europe and with the maturing of the generous 
1928 pension insurance further convergence could be expected. Interwar Western European trends were 
also reflected in the changes of the qualifying conditions for social security benefits. The means-test 
principle was assigned a secondary role behind the insurance principle and specific qualifying conditions 
such as the age limits and waiting period of pension insurance, or the waiting period of health insurance 
also approached Western European standards. At the same time, the pattern of coverage with high benefit 
levels conforms to the Bismarckian tradition, and constitutes the application of the Bismarckian principles 
to a dominantly agrarian society with a relatively small working class.   
Before the Second World War the organisational features of Hungarian social security programs 
resembled those of the countries following Bismarckian principles. Similarly to Germany and Austria, programs 
were introduced in the form of compulsory insurance. The unique feature of Hungarian development is the 
centralisation that took place within the framework of this system. Moreover, several types of schemes had self-
governments before the First World War and in the 1930s, which operated just as democratically as many of 
their Western European counterparts. 
 
Turning to development in the second half of the century, in welfare expenditures the most striking 
feature of the communist regime just establishing itself was the moderate nature of welfare efforts both 
compared to efforts in Hungary in the interwar period and in international comparison. In terms of social 
insurance expenditures, social security expenditures and social expenditures relative to the GDP, Hungary  
 
 
diverged from Western Europe until the end of the 1970s. Moreover, in 1980 Hungary was still more behind the 
West than in 1930. 
Regarding the relative levels of Western European and Hungarian welfare expenditures, the 1970s or, 
rather, the 1980s may be seen as the beginning of a new era. In terms of social insurance and social security 
expenditures the gap was narrowing from the 1970s, a process accelerating at the end of the 1980s. This was due 
to, first, the recession in Hungary that was reflected in the stagnation of the GDP, and, secondly, also the 
stagnation of Western European social expenditures. This dynamics does not hold for total social expenditures, 
as these also show divergence between Hungary and Western Europe in the 1970s and 1980s, with the exception 
of the last few years of the observed period, mainly due to an increasing uniformity of the countries of Western 
Europe. 
 In the realm of the institutional features, differences between Western Europe and Hungary began to 
increase from the middle of the century as well. The changes in the functions of social security were specifically 
contradictory in communist Hungary. On the one hand, the elimination of traditional institutions of poor relief 
increased the significance of social security programs, and, on the other, the influence of social policy in other 
areas, which enjoyed relative autonomy in Western European societies (such as price mechanisms or the labour 
market), decreased the importance of social security within the whole welfare system. The differentiation of 
social security programs continued in Hungary but with priorities different than in Western Europe, with its 
prime considerations related to the efficiency of production and the mobilisation of the work force. The 
differences in the relative significance of institutions are also shown by the structure of expenditures. In the first 
two decades, the most important characteristic was the low ratio of pension-related expenditures and the 
relatively high ratio of those receiving health care compared to Western Europe. The changes observed between 
1960 and 1980 signalled an advancement toward Western European pattern only in the growth in the proportions 
of pension expenditures. As regards other expenditure items, the trends were opposite. In contrast to Western 
Europe, the relative decrease in health expenditures and the opposite process in family benefits represent 
especially strong divergences. As a significant difference, it is also important to mention the complete lack of 
unemployment expenditures in Hungary. 
After the Second World War the degree of coverage increased at a significant pace in Hungary, 
with ratios close to the Western European average even in the first decades. In contrast, the politically 
motivated discrimination of certain social groups, most of all, farmers, in the 50s meant more of a 
divergence from Western Europe regarding qualifying conditions, even if these could not have been 
regarded unified for all walks of social security in the given period either. The marked levelling off in the 
level of benefits, even eliminating rights obtained earlier, is another characteristic of the early communist 
welfare system that had no parallel phenomenon in the West. The level of benefits relative to earnings was 
also low in comparison to Western Europe. However, the crudest forms of discrimination were eliminated 
in Hungary in the second half of the 1950s. The growing significance of the solidarity principle of the 
1960s and 1970s in the area of qualifying conditions, paired with the rapid increase of the coverage, can be 
regarded as moves toward universality in accordance with Western European processes. Moreover, in 
Hungary the whole population was covered by social insurance sooner than in most Western European 
countries. The relative level of benefits does not turn out so favourably in a Western European comparison, 
although the ratio of pensions relative to earnings corresponded to the Western average in the early 1980s. 
By the 1980s in Hungary an increasing number of benefits were granted on the basis of citizenship, and 
from the mid 1970s all in kind benefits of health care belonged to this category, similarly to the British or 
Swedish systems. At the same time, other important social  
 
security services, e.g. pensions or sick pay were closely tied to the contributions paid, regarding both their 
qualifying conditions and their levels, which is similar to the Western European welfare type called 
conservative or corporatist. These similarities to a different type of Western European welfare regimes 
suggest that by the 1980s the Hungarian social insurance system applied a combination of elements 
customary in Western Europe as qualifying conditions. Although this is not a distinct feature compared to 
the interwar period, in this area it signals a new convergence to Western Europe in contrast to the 1950s. 
Thus, besides the characteristics discussed earlier (for example in the structure of expenditures, in the 
functions of social insurance and in the principles of qualification) the Hungarian welfare – or, rather, social 
security – system shared features both with the Scandinavian social democratic and the  continental Western 
European conservative models by the end of the period under examination. At the same time, after the Second 
World War a strong divergence began to appear between Hungary and Western Europe with regards to 
organisational issues in social insurance and such differences basically persisted all through the communist 
period. In most Western European countries the state commanded an increasing role in the operation of social 
insurance in the decades following the Second World War. However, the complete nationalisation of social 
security in Hungary allowed considerably greater influence for the state than anywhere in Western Europe and 
resulted in an organisational construction unknown there. Until the mid 1980s the operation of social security 
was in the hands of trade unions, themselves an organic part of the power structure of the party state. In addition, 
there was no democratic control of any kind over social security schemes. Elected self-governments did not exist 
and the lack of democratic control over the state administration made even indirect control impossible, thus 
turning this aspect of social security into the welfare area where divergence from Western Europe was of the 
greatest degree. 
Furthermore, one of the most important lessons of the study of Hungarian welfare development is 
that neither economic nor other factors are able to explain the characteristics of the emergence and 
development of welfare programs in themselves. That is, there is no single-cause explanation of the 
emergence and development of the welfare state. Moreover, the determinants of development changed 
over time and individual determinants had different relevance in different periods. On the one hand, it is 
indubitable that there existed a correlation between socio-economic development and the development of 
welfare systems in Hungary, too. Economic development and, in its wake, the changes in demographic 
factors and the maturing of programs contributed to the long term development of social security 
programs. On the other hand, however, the emergence of welfare programs or their timing is not explained 
in the least by the level of socio-economic development. In contrast, diffusion, i.e. the demonstration 
effects of German and Austrian welfare legislature and practice could have had an important role in this. 
Political factors such as the constitutional monarchy, the legitimisation claims of the elites, the relative 
weakness of liberalism and national emancipatory efforts vis-à-vis Austria promoting industry are 
additional factors influencing the expansion of social security programs at an early date, to workers and in 
a compulsory form. In the interpretation of the interwar development the political constellation, i.e. the 
political influence of Christian parties and the assertion of landowners’ interests, can also be attributed 
greater weight than economic and social conditions. The welfare system of the communist era was not 
simply defined by economic and social development, either. The dynamics of the changes were influenced 
to a much greater degree by ideological and political factors, crises, and legitimisation efforts. 
All this discussed above can have important consequences regarding the study of social 
convergences. The convergence theory of the 1960s claimed that important features of societies become 
increasingly similar in  
 
the process of modernisation, independent of political regime and cultural or other characteristics, merely 
as a result of needs and possibilities created by technological and economic development. Hungarian 
welfare development contradicts this, because differences in this area were diminishing in the first half of 
the 20th century, to be on the rise in the second between Western Europe and Hungary. As regards 
demographic and family development, discussed elsewhere, convergent and divergent processes in the 
respective periods were even more pronounced. These trends reflected the changes of the political system, 
especially its strong divergence from Western Europe following the Second World War. Although 
Hungarian welfare development studied here does not necessarily contradict that economic and 
technological change may bring about social convergence, it calls attention to the circumstance that this 
convergence can be hindered by differences in political conditions. 
 
Appendix  
Indicators of welfare development in Western Europe and Hungary, 1900-1990 
 
 
Year 
Hungarian data 
(1) 
West. Eu. 
 mean 
(2) 
West. Eu.  
standard 
deviation  
(3) 
West. Eu. 
coeff. of 
variation 
Standardized 
Hungarian 
data 
 = (1–2)/3  
Social insurance expenditures (as % of GDP) 
1930 (1.60) 2.53 1.67 .66 (-.56)
1940 (2.70) 4.30 . . .
1950 3.20 4.99 1.62 .32 -1.11
1960 5.00 7.23 1.47 .20 -1.51
1970 7.50 11.12 1.86 .17 -1.94
1980 11.50 15.45 3.59 .23 -1.10
1990 14.50 16.86 5.10 .30 -.46
 Social expenditures of central government (as % of GNP) 
1890 . .67 .30 .44 .
1900 . .79 .38 .48 .
1910 . .99 .46 .47 .
1920 . 1.18 .68 .58 .
1930 .64 2.16 1.42 .66 -1.07
Social security expenditures (as % of GDP) 
1950 3.80 9.38 2.88 .31 -1.94
1960 5.80 11.43 2.38 .21 -2.36
1970 8.90 15.77 2.96 .19 -2.32
1980 14.20 22.82 5.12 .22 -1.68
1990 18.40 24.03 5.77 .24 -.98
Social expenditures (as % of GDP) 
1950 . 12.31 3.57 .29 .
1960 11.30 15.62 3.50 .22 -1.24
1970 13.90 21.44 4.33 .20 -1.74
1980 19.60 29.99 5.84 .19 -1.78
1990 27.80 30.23 5.19 .15 -1.32
 
 
Distribution of social security expenditures and family allow. in 1960 (%) 
Health care 33.1 15.39 9.61 .62 1.84
Pensions 38.7 49.98 11.31 .23 -1.00
Unempl. .00 4.32 4.09 .95 -1.06
Family allow. 12.20 17.28 10.66 .62 -.48
Others 16.00 13.02 5.31 .41 .56
Distribution of social security expenditures and family allow. in 1980 (%) 
Health care 17.50 30.32 7.52 .25 -1.70
Pensions 55.10 45.99 9.94 .22 .92
Unempl. .00 6.45 5.56 .86 -1.16
Family all. 13.30 8.04 4.47 .56 1.18
Others 14.10 9.19 3.61 .39 1.36
 Distribution of social security revenues in 1960 (%) 
Employees 13.10 20.78 10.12 .49 -.76
Employers 49.20 34.73 17.80 .51 .81
Special taxes .00 .36 .86 2.37 -.42
From governm. 37.10 39.71 21.97 .55 -.12
Capital rev. .10 2.95 3.00 1.01 -.95
Others .40 1.46 2.11 1.45 -.50
 Distribution of social security revenues in 1980 (%) 
Employees 14.60 19.15 12.76 .67 -.36
Employers 41.10 36.69 13.69 .37 .32
Special taxes .00 .22 .54 2.52 -.40
From governm. 43.60 40.0 19.87 .50 .18
Capital rev. .00 3.15 2.94 .94 -1.07
Others .60 .78 .93 1.18 -.20
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coverage of employment injury insurance (as % of economically active population) 
1900 . 16.17 20.39 1.26 .
1910 . 30.67 22.72 .74 .
1920 . 39.85 22.77 .57 .
1930 39.00 50.46 14.45 .29 -.79
1940 35.00 52.92 17.18 .32 -1.04
1950 47.00 60.77 16.33 .27 -.84
1960 85.00 71.54 14.79 .21 .91
1970 97.00 78.15 12.52 .16 1.51
1980 100.00 85.13 13.24 .16 1.12
1990 100.00 88.88 17.85 .20 .62
Coverage of health insurance (members as % of the labour force) 
1900 . 9.83 12.56 1.28 .
1910 . 15.42 18.61 1.21 .
1920 (25.00) 33.23 30.46 .92 (-.27)
1930 (27.00) 46.62 28.00 .60 (-.70)
1940 (27.00) 56.58 28.89 .51 (-1.02)
1950 47.00 66.69 29.44 .44 -.67
1960 85.00 73.69 28.41 .39 .40
1970 97.00 90.23 12.85 .14 .53
1980 100.00 93.40 8.81 .09 .75
1990 100.00 97.40 5.27 .05 .49
Coverage of sickness cash benefits (insured persons as % of the labour force) 
1900 . 9.83 12.56 1.28 .
1910 . 15.42 18.61 1.21 .
1920 25.00 33.23 30.46 .92 -.27
1930 27.00 46.62 28.00 .60 -.70
1940 27.00 56.58 28.89 .51 -1.02
1950 46.00 66.69 29.44 .44 -.70
1960 63.00 73.69 28.41 .39 -.38
1970 79.00 90.23 12.85 .14 -.87
1980 83.00 93.40 8.81 .09 -1.18
1990 (100.00) 97.40 5.27 .05 (.49)
 
 
 
Coverage of pension insurance (members as % of the labour force) 
1900 . 5.83 15.21 2.61 .
1910 . 8.25 16.54 2.01 .
1920 . 22.69 31.31 1.38 .
1930 16.00 44.00 36.40 .83 -.77
1940 30.00 66.83 32.48 .49 -1.13
1950 47.00 76.85 22.77 .30 -1.31
1960 85.00 90.54 11.49 .13 -.48
1970 97.00 92.69 10.53 .11 .41
1980 100.00 95.90 6.94 .07 .59
1990 100.00 98.50 4.74 .05 .32
 
Notes: Brackets refer to serious limitations in the comparability of data. 
Sources: For Hungarian data see Tables 1-18, in Bela Tomka, The welfare state in 20th century Hungary in 
comparative perspective (Unpubl. Manuscript).; Western European data are own calculations based on Tables 1-
18 in the same work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
